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Right Moves? Immigration, Globalization, Utopia, and Dystopia

Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco

Over the past decade, globalization has intensified worldwide economic, social, and cultural transformations. Globalization is structured by three powerful, interrelated formations: (1) the postnationalization of production and distribution of goods and services, fueled by growing levels of international trade, foreign direct investment, and capital market flows, (2) the emergence of new information and communication technologies that place a premium on knowledge-intensive work, and (3) unprecedented levels of worldwide migration that generate significant demographic and cultural changes in most regions of the world.

Globalization's puzzle is that although many applaud it as the royal road for development (for example, Friedman 2000; Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2000; Rubin 2002), it is generating strong currents of discontent. In large regions of the world, globalization has become a deeply disorienting and threatening process of change (Bauman 1998; Soros 2002; Stiglitz 2002). Globalization has generated the most hostilities where it has placed local cultural identities—including local meaning systems, religious identities, and systems of livelihood—under siege. Argentina is a case in point. After a decade of cutting-edge free

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market policies, the economy of the country that was once the darling of such embodiments of globalization as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank imploded. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Argentina was one of the ten wealthiest countries in the world, yet it ended the century in default, with more than 40 percent of the population at poverty level. By early 2003, an estimated 50,000 *cartoneros* were living off the cartons they gathered every night from trash cans in Buenos Aires, one of the world's most elegant cities.

First and foremost, globalization is about movement. Its emerging regime—mobile capital, mobile production and distribution, mobile populations, and mobile cultures—is generating deep paradoxes. Regions of the world such as East Asia seem to have prospered immensely under globalization's regime (see Table 2.1, World Bank 2001). Yet, in the Argentinias of the world, the forces of globalization have conspired to intensify patterns of inequality and human suffering (Dussel 2000; Mittelman 2000; Nader 1993). The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed vast economic growth in the rich nations, especially the United States, but roughly 25 percent of the population of the developing world continued to live in desperate poverty, on less than a dollar a day (refer to Table 1.1). China's meteoric integration into the global economy has significantly reduced poverty, but, as in much of Latin America, globalization has also increased inequality (World Bank 2001:1).

There is a strong and somewhat amorphous, eclectic anti-globalization ethos, ubiquitously named, articulated, and performed in varied contexts, from Seattle to Genoa and Buenos Aires. Its message seems structured by a common grammar: The global project is destabilizing, disorienting, and threatening to large numbers of people the world over.

Yet, even though many hate what they see in globalization, others are seduced by its promise. Here is another paradox of globalization: As it continues to penetrate the local cultural imaginaries of poor developing countries, even if it destabilizes local economies and livelihoods, globalization generates structures of desire and consumption fantasies that local economies cannot fulfill. These twin factors, globalization's uneven effects on the world economy and the emergence of a global imaginary of consumption, are behind the largest wave of immigration in human history. Globalization's paradoxical power lies in its

TABLE 2.1

*Population Living below US \$1 per Day in Developing Countries
1990 and 1998*

	<i>Number of People below US \$1 a Day (Millions)</i>		<i>Poverty Rate (%)</i>	
	1990	1998 (Estimate)	1990	1998 (Estimate)
East Asia	452.4	278.3	27.6	15.3
Excluding China	92.0	65.1	18.5	11.3
South Asia	495.1	522.0	44.0	40.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	242.3	290.9	47.7	46.3
Latin America	73.8	78.2	16.8	15.6
Middle East/North Africa	5.7	5.5	2.4	1.9
Europe and Central Asia	7.1	24.0	1.6	5.1
Total	1276.4	1198.9	29.0	24.0

Source: World Bank. Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 2000.

manufacture of both despair and hope. Millions of people, though, must realize their hope elsewhere, as migrants.

Globalization's discontent also visits the "other half," the wealthy, advanced, postindustrial democracies, which have, arguably, benefited the most under its reign. In the advanced, postindustrial democracies, the unprecedented, growing, and seemingly uncontrollable migratory flows generated by globalization over the past decade are, alas, experienced as threatening and disorienting to local cultural identities and sensibilities. This is the case in most of western Europe, the United States, and Australia, where anti-immigrant sentiment and xenophobia have emerged as potentially explosive political and social concerns. The general move to the political right in Europe over the past few years can be linked to the fears and anxieties generated by globalization, immigration, and crime. Somewhat monomaniacal anti-immigrant parties in western Europe have gained momentum over the past decade: the Vlaams Bloc in Belgium, the Freedom Party in Austria, the People's Party in Denmark, and, of course, in May 2002, the Front National in France. Voters in California overwhelmingly approved Proposition 187, a new law that denies illegal immigrants a host of publicly funded services, including schooling children. In mid-2001, Australia denied a

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ship in distress, carrying hundreds of asylum seekers, entry to its ports. To paraphrase Tolstoy, globalization is making all the families of the world unhappy in the same way.

In this chapter, I examine certain anthropological concerns related to large-scale immigration and the flow of labor within the paradigm of globalization—a paradigm that will continue to attract the attention of anthropologists and allied social scientists in the decades to come (Inda and Rosaldo 2002b; Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, and Qin-Hilliard 2003). First, I explore the parameters of the phenomena called “globalization.” Next, I turn to the topic of large-scale immigration and examine recent scholarly debates in a variety of social science disciplines, including (but not limited to) cultural anthropology. Last, I examine several cultural processes of change facing those who pursue their fortunes beyond their national boundaries—the area ripest for important anthropological theoretical and empirical work in the future.

GLOBAL ANXIETIES

The study of globalization is generating considerable academic interest in a variety of disciplines, including anthropology, economics, sociology, political science, law, and education—for example, Appadurai 1996; Bauman 1998; Baylis and Smith 1997; Castles and Davidson 2000; Giddens 2000; Hardt and Negri 2000; Inda and Rosaldo 2002b; Jameson and Miyoshi 1999; King 1997; Lechner and Boli 1999; O’Meara, Mehlinger, and Krain 2000; Sassen 1998.

The term *globalization* in its current usage is quite broad and lacks well-defined epistemological, theoretical, and empirical boundaries. Even though the idea of globalization has gained increased circulation in the social sciences and is pregnant with potential—especially for theorizing broad processes of social change, from Detroit to Delhi—we cannot fully mine its analytic use until we attend to basic definitional and theoretical matters. Anthropologists, for example, tend to approach the problem of globalization in relation to their long-term interest in social organization and culture. Globalization detaches social practices and cultural formations from their traditional moorings in bounded (often national) territories. Globalization decisively undermines the once imagined neat fit of language, culture, and

nation. One hundred years ago, European and Euro-American anthropologists took long journeys to remote locations to study exotic social institutions and cultural beliefs. Globalization now delivers the “exotic” to the anthropologist’s own backyard. In plain sight, Turkish cultural formations—language, marriage, kinship, ritual practices—are as ubiquitous in parts of Frankfurt as they are in Istanbul. Likewise, Mexican culture is now thriving in New York City. New York culture is alive in Puebla, Mexico, via the cash and social remittances—that is, the social practices and cultural models immigrants acquire in the new setting and remit back home (Levitt 2001a). Hence, we have witnessed over the past decade the emergence of an anthropological taste for topics such as immigration (Chavez 1992; Foner 2000, 2001e and f; Pessar 1995b; Roosens 1989), transnationalism (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994; Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Mahler 1995a), cultural hybrids (Canclini 1995), delicious dualities (Zentella 2002), and unsettling cultural conflicts (Shweder 2000; Wikan 2000), all brought about by globalization.

Anthropological involvement with the study of cultural forms and dispersal across time and space has a long history. Much of the early literature privileged the study of “culture contact” and “cultural borrowing” via trading, migrations, invasions, or conquest. Franz Boas’s (1911b and 1940) early efforts, which resulted in the firm establishment of American anthropology as a major scholarly discipline in the early decades of the twentieth century, centered around theoretical debates over the “diffusion” (versus “multiple invention”) of cultural forms (such as a fishing hook, folktale motif, or kinship term) across distinct culture areas. This work was critical to the dismantling of earlier extravagant and racist theories of stages in the cultural evolution of societies. Today, few anthropologists focus their theoretical or empirical work on culture areas or patterns of cultural diffusion *per se*. However, there is a strong genealogical line of continuity of anthropological concerns with the movement of people, cultural facts, and artifacts over time.

Political theorists, including political anthropologists, are focusing on the emergence of international systems, such as human and civil rights, reaching beyond the confines of individual nation-states. An Argentine torturer accused of committing crimes against humanity in

his own country can now be arrested in Mexico and tried in Spain, as happened in February 2001 (Robben n.d.). Political theorists have also begun to examine how new deterritorializing processes shape the course of political fortunes in many parts of the world. Peoples in diaspora—Mexicans in Los Angeles and Dominicans in New York, for example—are emerging as powerful agents across national boundaries. Dual-citizenship agreements—the ability to maintain citizenship rights in more than one nation-state—are complicating the politics of belonging and making them more interesting (Castles and Davidson 2000).

Dominican politicians, for instance, have long been cognizant that election campaigns in their country need to be waged as much in New York, where Dominicans are now the largest immigrant group, as in Santo Domingo. Mexican politicians are now joining the new global game. In late December 2000, newly elected President Vicente Fox spent a day at Mexico's busy northern border personally welcoming some of the 1.5 million immigrants returning home for Christmas—as well as performing and telecasting a new strategic approach to paisanos living in the United States. Under the Fox administration, the more than eight million Mexican citizens living in the United States are no longer an afterthought (or an embarrassment) to Mexican national pride. Likewise, the Salvadorian political leadership carefully takes into consideration the needs and voices of the Salvadorian diaspora in the United States. As a rough formula, a million people in the diaspora translates to nearly a billion dollars in remittances sent home every year. This might help explain the newfound interest among Salvadorian and Mexican politicians in cultivating ties with their brothers and sisters living in the United States. The old adage “all politics is local” is now anachronistic.

For the purposes of this chapter, I define *globalization* as processes of change simultaneously generating centrifugal (as the territory of the nation-state) and centripetal (as supra-national nodes) forces that result in the deterritorialization of basic economic, social, and cultural practices from their traditional moorings in the nation-state. Because globalization involves a kind of “post-geography” (Bauman 1998), mapping it is futile. Different regions of the world are, at once, implicated in multiple, overlapping globalization processes. Although *globalization*, by definition, refers to economic, social, and cultural processes

that are postnational, I do not mean to suggest that it augurs the demise of the state apparatus. It is, I think, subtler than that.

Nation-states seem to respond to processes of globalization by displaying new forms of hyper-presence and hyper-absence. Globalization challenges the workings of the nation-state in various ways, from undermining national economies to making anachronistic traditional ideas of citizenship and of cultural production (Castles and Davidson 2000; Sassen 1998). In important ways, states appear hyper-absent qua the forces of globalization, for example, when billions of dollars enter and exit national boundaries with the apparatus of the state having little say over the course of these flows. On the other hand, states are responding to globalization by hyper-displays and performances of power. Arguably one of the most globalized spots in the world today and, alas, one of the most heavily trafficked international borders in the world is the vast region that both unites and separates the United States and Mexico. It is also one of the most heavily guarded borders in history (Andreas 2000). The militarization of the border at a time of record border crossings suggests a process more complex than the simple erosion or demise of the nation-state. In the places that matter, where states bump into each other, hyper-presence seems to be in full force. This is the case in post-September 11 United States, in post-Schengen Europe, and in Japan. (Per the Schengen agreement, there are no longer internal border controls among European Union member states. Hence, a French citizen needs no passport or visa to travel to Spain, and vice-versa.) Even though, internally, Europe has become borderless, external controls—that is, keeping would-be migrants from outside Europe—have intensified (Andreas and Snyder 2000). To claim that the state is waning is to miss one of the more delicious paradoxes of state performance.

What, if anything, is new about globalization? Is globalization simply modernization on steroids? Is it Westernization in fast-forward? Is it imperialism now driven by the extraordinarily high octane of American hyper-power? Alternatively, is it a phenomenon or a set of phenomena of a completely different order? Prominent scholars have claimed that globalization is best conceptualized as part of a long process of change, perhaps centuries in the making (Coatsworth 2002; Mignolo 1998; Sen 2000; Taylor 2002; Williamson 2002).

Two of globalization's three main currents represent continuity with previous processes of economic, social, and cultural change, but the third suggests a new and heretofore unseen force. Globalization is the product of new information and communication technologies that connect people, organizations, and systems across vast distances. In addition to creating and instantaneously circulating vast amounts of information and data, these technologies hold the promise of freeing people from the tyranny of space and time. These new technologies are rapidly and irrevocably changing the nature of work, thought, and the interpersonal patterning of social relations (Turkle 1997).¹

In other ways, though, globalization now seems to mimic previous cycles of integration. For example, the globalization of capital is nothing new. If anything, it was more impressive one hundred years ago than it is today (Coatsworth 2002; Taylor 2002; Williamson 2002). At the beginning of the new millennium, financial markets, direct foreign investment, capital flow, and the production and distribution of goods and services continue to be highly globalized.

According to the World Bank (2001:1), a "growing share of what countries produce is sold to other foreigners as exports. Among rich or developed countries, the share of international trade in total output (exports plus imports of goods relative to GDP) rose from 27 to 39 percent between 1987 and 1997. For the developing countries it rose from 10 to 17 percent." Likewise, foreign direct investment (that is, firms making investments in other countries) overall "more than tripled between 1988 and 1998 from US\$ 192 billion to US\$ 610 billion" (ibid). From the time you woke up this morning to the time you go to bed tonight, more than a trillion dollars will cross national boundaries (Friedman 2000). The archetypical American car, the Chevrolet Camaro, is now a thoroughly globalized product. It is built nowhere and everywhere; the capital, labor, and parts originate in multiple continents. It is a car "on the move," so to speak, from its very conception. The global market is also generating global tastes. McDonald's now is Brazil's largest employer (Schlosser 2001). Market forces seduce and manipulate in even the remotest parts of the world with stunning results.

Another feature of globalization that seems to continue an old story is large-scale immigration. Globalization is about deterritorialization not only of markets, information, symbols, and tastes but also of

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large and growing numbers of people. Large-scale immigration is a world phenomenon that is transforming Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. Sweden, a country of nearly nine million people, now has roughly one million immigrants. Approximately 30 percent of Frankfurt's population is immigrant. Amsterdam, by the year 2015, will be 50-percent immigrant. Leicester, England, is about to become the first city in Europe where "whites" are no longer the majority. Long held as the exception to the North American and European rule that immigrant workers are needed to maintain economic vitality, Japan is now facing a future in which immigrants will play a significant role (Tsuda 1996, 2003). Asia and Africa have large numbers of asylum seekers, refugees, and displaced persons (UNHCR 2001).

Globalization is the general backdrop for any understanding of the anthropology of immigration. At the turn of the millennium, an estimated 175 million transnational immigrants and refugees are living beyond their homelands. Globalization has increased immigration in a variety of ways. First, transnational capital flows tend to stimulate migration; where capital flows, immigrants follow (see, *inter alia*, Sassen 1988). Second, the new information, communication, and media technologies at the heart of globalization tend to stimulate migration because they encourage new cultural expectations, tastes, consumption practices, and lifestyle choices. Would-be immigrants imagine better opportunities elsewhere and mobilize to achieve them. Third, deeply globalized economies are increasingly structured around a voracious appetite for foreign workers. Fourth, the affordability of mass transportation has put the migration option within the reach of millions who, heretofore, could not do so. In the year 2000, approximately 1.5 billion airline tickets were sold. Fifth, globalization has stimulated new migration because it has produced uneven results. In Zhou and Gatewood's (2000:10) excellent summary,

Globalization perpetuates emigration from developing countries in two significant ways. First,....capital investments into developing countries transform the economic and occupational structures in these countries by disproportionately targeting production for export and taking advantage of raw material and cheap labor. Such twisted development,

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characterized by the robust growth of low skilled jobs in export manufacturing, draws a large number of rural, and particularly female workers, into the urban labor markets.... Second, economic development following the American model in many developing countries stimulates consumerism and consumption and raises expectations regarding the standard of living. The widening gap between consumption expectations and the available standards of living within the structural constraints of the developing countries, combined with easy access to information and migration networks, in turn create tremendous pressure for emigration....Consequently,...capital investments in developing countries have resulted in the paradox of rapid economic growth and high emigration from these countries to the United States.

Any anthropological consideration of globalization must reflect upon the pains it has generated in certain regions of the developing world, perpetuating unemployment and further depressing wages (Bauman 1998; Dussel 2000). On the winning side of the new globalization game, jobs have increased in certain regions of the world. These jobs include the knowledge-intensive sector of the new economy and more traditional jobs in service and agriculture. The growth in jobs in globalization's winning zones has acted as an unstoppable vacuum, pulling millions of immigrants—skilled and unskilled, legal and illegal—from the developing world into the wealthier centers of the Northern Hemisphere.

LIVES BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

In recent years, there has been renewed interest in the study of human migration (Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco and Qin-Hilliard 2001a). Anthropologists have made significant theoretical contributions to the study of immigration. For example, see George DeVos's work on immigration and minority status in comparative perspective (DeVos 1992; Kleinberg and DeVos 1973; Lee and DeVos 1981), Nina Glick Schiller's collaborative work on immigration and transnationalism (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994; Glick Schiller,

Basch, and Blanc-Szanton 1992a; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001a), and John Ogbu's work on immigration and anthropology of education (Ogbu 1974, 1978; Ogbu and Matute-Bianchi 1986). Sociologists, demographers, and labor economists are also conducting important new research on immigration in the social sciences. The next generation of anthropological studies of immigration will be increasingly required to reckon systematically with the approaches and findings of our colleagues in allied disciplines and to continue making a case for the unique perspectives emerging from the ethnographic process. Interdisciplinary collaborations between allied social scientists are likely to provide the increasingly sophisticated scholarly frames now needed to deal with the complexities of immigration in the global era.

During the last decades of the twentieth century, most major nation-states saw the topic of immigration emerge as a significant issue with important public-opinion, policy, and research implications. Migration, from the Latin *migrare*, meaning "to change residence," has been a defining feature in the making of humanity from our very emergence as a species in the African savanna. Social scientists have traditionally defined *migration* as the more or less permanent movement of people across space (Petersen 1968). In the language of the social sciences, people "emigrate" out of one location and become "immigrants" in a new setting.

The idea of migration as the permanent movement of people across space suggests several important concerns. First is the relative permanence of immigrants in a new setting. For many (perhaps most), immigration represents a final move; for others, it is a temporary state before eventually returning "home." A central feature of the great transatlantic immigration that took place between Europe and North and South America from the 1890s until the 1910s was the high proportion of people who returned to Europe. By some accounts, more than a third of the Europeans who came to the Americas went back "home" (Moya 1998).

Sojourners represent another pattern of labor flow in which temporality defines immigration. They are the many immigrants who move for well-defined periods of time, often following a seasonal cycle, and eventually return home. Large numbers of migrant workers have followed this pattern—from African workers in the Sub-Saharan

region to Mexican agricultural workers in California (Cornelius 1992).

A third type comprises the many new immigrants worldwide who constantly shuttle back and forth. In recent years, certain scholars of immigration have argued that new transnational and global forces structure the journeys of immigrants in more complex ways than previously seen. Anthropologists have been at the forefront of this conceptual and empirical work (for example, Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994). This research suggests that many immigrants remain substantially engaged (economically, politically, and culturally) in their newly adopted lands and in their communities of origin, moving back and forth in ways seldom seen in previous eras of large-scale immigration (Suárez-Orozco 1998).

The idea of immigration as movement across space also requires elaboration. Viewed anthropologically, immigration involves a change in residency and a change in community. Over the years, scholars have concentrated on two major types of large-scale migration: *internal migration* (within the confines of a nation-state) and *international migration* (across international borders). Although many scholars would argue that the large-scale movement of people within a nation-state is a phenomenon of a separate order from the large-scale movement of people across international borders, the differences between these two broad types of migration are often quite blurred.

Frequently, internal migrants share many characteristics with international migrants: Many move from rural villages to urban centers, many experience linguistic and cultural discontinuities, and many face the same bureaucratic and legal restrictions and discriminations international migrants do. Much attention has been focused on international migration. Today, though, most immigrants are internal migrants staying within the confines of their nation-states (China, Egypt, and Brazil have experienced high levels of internal migration). In fact, in spite of the impression that the majority of international migrants are heading to the developed world (that is, Europe and North America), most immigration today is an intra-continental (that is, within Asia, within Africa) phenomenon. China alone has an estimated 100 million internal migrants who, in many ways, experience circumstances similar to those that transnational migrants face when moving across countries (Eckholm 2001:10). Some of the most important anthropological

contributions to the study of immigration have focused on internal migration (for example, Brandes 1975; Colson 1971; Kemper 1977; Morgan and Colson 1987; and Scudder and Colson 1982).

**MOVING ON—THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
OF LARGE-SCALE IMMIGRATION**

Scholars of immigration have generally theorized patterns of migration flows in terms of economic forces, social processes, and cultural practices (Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, and Qin-Hilliard 2001a). Social scientists who privilege the economic aspects of immigration have examined how variables such as unemployment, underemployment, lack of access to credit, and, especially, wage differentials are implicated in labor migration (Dussel 2000; Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, and Qin-Hilliard 2001b). Anthropologist Jorge Durand, working with an interdisciplinary team of colleagues, has argued that international migration emerges as a risk management and diversifying strategy deployed by families and communities hoping to place their eggs in various territorial baskets (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). Changing cultural models about social standards and economic expectations have also been implicated in why people migrate (Moya 1998). In many cases, people migrate to actualize new consumption and lifestyle standards.

In nearly all advanced, postindustrial economies, bifurcated labor markets have worked as a powerful gravitational field, attracting many immigrants to work in the low-wage, low-status, and low-skilled secondary sector. Anthropologist T. Tsuda (1996, 2003) has noted that in Japan immigrant workers are sometimes called “3 k workers”; *3 k* is for the Japanese words meaning “dirty, demanding, and dangerous.” When certain sectors of the opportunity structure are culturally coded as “immigrant jobs,” they become stigmatized, and native workers tend to shun them almost regardless of wage dynamics. What would it take, in terms of wages, to make backbreaking work such as strawberry picking in California *not* an immigrant occupation?

Anthropological scholars of immigration have long maintained that cultural and social practices can generate—and sustain—substantial migratory flows. In many regions of the world, such as Ireland and Mexico, migration has been an adulthood-defining rite of passage

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(Durand 1998; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). In some cases, people migrate because others—relatives, friends, and friends of friends—migrated before them. The best predictor of who will migrate is who has already migrated. Transnational family reunification continues to be a critical vector in immigration today. In the year 1996, 915,900 immigrants were formally admitted in the United States. Among them, 594,604 were family-sponsored immigrants (Suárez-Orozco 1999). Since the early 1970s, family reunification has been one of the few formal ways to migrate into Europe (Suárez-Orozco 1994).

A number of studies have examined how transnational migratory social chains, once established, can generate a powerful momentum of their own. As Patricia Pessar explains in Chapter 3, gender is deeply implicated in the making of these chains. Established immigrants lower the costs of subsequent immigration because they ease the transition of new arrivals by sharing crucial economic, linguistic, and cultural knowledge—about job openings, good wages, fair bosses, and dignified working conditions (Waldinger 1997).

Other recent research highly relevant to anthropological concerns engages the theoretical debate over the role of immigrant workers in the global, postindustrial economy. In the context of the increasingly advanced, knowledge-intensive economies of today, are low-skilled immigrant workers anachronistic? Are immigrant workers a leftover from an earlier era of production?²²

The comparative research of anthropologist “Gaku” (T.) Tsuda and political scientist Wayne Cornelius on the use of immigrant labor in two paradigmatic postindustrial economic settings—San Diego County, California, US, and Hamamatsu, Japan—suggests a remarkable convergence in patterns of growing reliance on immigrant labor, in spite of marked differences in national context (for example, see Cornelius 1998). These data reveal a pattern of an enduring, indeed voracious, postindustrial demand for immigrant labor. Cornelius (1998:128) concludes, “As immigrants become a preferred labor force, employers do more to retain them, even in a recessionary economy.”

These data suggest that immigrant workers become desirable to a wide variety of employers for three basic reasons. First, immigrants are willing to do low-pay work with little or no prospects for upward mobility, work that is boring, dirty, or dangerous but critical, even in firms

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involving highly advanced technologies. Second, employers perceive immigrant workers quite favorably, as reliable, flexible, punctual, and willing to work overtime. Often, employers prefer them to native-born workers. Third, immigrant transnational labor-recruiting networks are a powerful method for “delivering eager new recruits to the employer’s doorstep with little or no effort on his part” (Cornelius 1998:128).

We have a reasonable understanding of how love (family reunification) and work drive immigration. On the other hand, the role of war and its relations to large-scale migratory flows has been generally neglected. Yet throughout history war and international migration have been closely linked. The threat of labor shortages during World War II led to temporary labor-recruiting efforts to attract much-needed immigrant workers to the United States (Calavita 1992). The resultant “*bracero*” program became a powerful force in building—via family reunification—a Mexican migration momentum that eventually turned into the largest and most powerful immigration flow into the United States in the twentieth century (Suárez-Orozco 1998).

In the aftermath of World War II, many of the major northwestern European democracies, such as Germany and Belgium, developed “guest worker programs” to recruit foreign workers, initially in southern Europe and subsequently in the Maghreb region of North Africa and in Turkey (Suárez-Orozco 1994, 1996). These programs came to an end in the early 1970s, but family-reunification and chain migration continued to bring immigrants from North Africa into Europe for years.

The Cold War deterred immigration, because of strict Iron Curtain controls, yet generated large population displacements. The robust Cuban diaspora in the United States can be traced more or less directly to the Cold War (Molyneux 1999). The low-intensity warfare in Central America during the 1980s generated the largest wave of emigration in the region’s history. As a result, there are now more than a million Central American immigrants in the United States (Suárez-Orozco 1989b). In the 1990s, the ongoing conflicts in Zimbabwe and Angola generated large-scale migratory flows, especially into South Africa. The recent war in Afghanistan resulted in major population displacements (nearly two million Afghans). As of mid 2003, the Iraq war seems not to have generated the huge population displacements that previous warfare has tended to create.

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Natural disasters have also displaced populations and started new migratory flows. The 1999 hurricanes, which devastated much of Central America, initiated significant flows of emigrants into North America.

GLOBAL FLOWS AND THE STATE

Whether social scientists examine the case of internal or international migrants, there is a consensus that the apparatus of the nation-state is decidedly implicated in migratory processes: by what the state does and by what it cannot do. States are in the business of regulating the movement of people, internally and internationally. The right to leave a country, to emigrate, is a recent phenomenon (Moya 1998).

Nation-states regulate, monitor, and police the inflow of international immigrants across borders. Large-scale international immigration is, in significant ways, the product of nation building. Argentina, Australia, and Israel come to mind as archetypal examples. Likewise, the reconfigurations of national boundaries have historically and contemporaneously generated large-scale migratory flows. The partition of British India into Pakistan and India stimulated one of the “largest migrations in human history” (Petersen 1968:290). More recently, the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia led to massive, mostly involuntary migratory movements.

In the area of international migration, nation-states generate policies designed to establish who is a legal or an illegal immigrant, who is an asylum seeker, a refugee, and a temporary guest worker. States regulate how many immigrants are legally admitted every year. The United States, for example, has admitted an average of nearly a million legal immigrants annually since 1990. On the other hand, legal immigration into northwestern Europe was greatly curbed following the oil crisis of the early 1970s (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994; Suárez-Orozco 1996).

States also regulate the flows of asylum seekers, those escaping a country because of a well-founded fear of persecution. Agents of the state decide who is formally admitted as a refugee. In the post-Cold War era, there has been an explosive growth in the numbers of asylum seekers worldwide. For example, some 369,000 foreigners requested asylum in Europe during the year 1998. Only a small portion of those seeking asylum are eventually granted formal refugee status.

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In recent years, many postindustrial democracies—including the United States and throughout northwestern Europe—have developed new strategies to deal with increasing numbers of asylum seekers (Suárez-Orozco 1994). For example, the 13,000 Kosovars who arrived in Germany in mid-1999 were given a three-month, renewable Temporary Protective Status on the condition that they not apply for refugee status, in effect, forfeiting all the rights and entitlements that come with formal refugee status. Similar arrangements were made for asylum seekers from Bosnia.

In the face of growing numbers of asylum seekers and a widespread public concern that many of them are economic refugees in search of a better life in wealthier countries, various countries have put into place new formal and informal strategies. Many of these new strategies seem to be designed to prevent asylum seekers from accessing safe countries, where, under Geneva Convention agreements, they would have the right to a fair hearing.

The high-seas interdiction program put into effect in the United States in the early 1990s is an example. The strategy was conceived to prevent large numbers of Caribbean (especially Haitian) asylum seekers from arriving in US territory, or even within its territorial waters, where they could establish certain legal protections. Apprehension in international waters and return to Haiti leave asylum seekers with little practical recourse under international law. In Europe, a similar strategy has been to deem certain areas in international airports not part of the national territory. For example, parts of the Zaventem airport are not technically Belgian territory but are considered to be international territory. Asylum seekers entering such airports have been turned back because they were said to remain in international territory and, therefore, did not come under the jurisprudence of the Geneva Convention (Suárez-Orozco 1994).

Although advanced, postindustrial democracies are likely to continue facing significant numbers of asylum seekers, the majority is in the developing world. For example, at the beginning of the millennium, there were more than three million asylum seekers in the African continent.

The state does wield substantial power regarding internal and international migration, but in certain areas it faces strict limitations in

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the management of human migratory flows. Nowhere are these limitations more obvious than in the state's inability to control illegal immigration. In many parts of the world, undocumented or illegal immigration has become a permanent problem that periodically emerges as an unsettling political issue.

In the United States, for example, it is estimated that by the turn of the millennium there were seven million illegal immigrants. In Europe, the number of illegal immigrants is a more carefully guarded secret because of its dangerous political connotations. Most hard-core, right-wing political parties in Europe, including France's Front National, Belgium's Vlams Bloc, and Austria's Freedom Party, revolve around anti-immigration (illegal) platforms. In the 1990s, these once marginal parties made substantial gains with electorates quite concerned about the problem of undocumented immigration.

The enduring problem of illegal immigration in many parts of the world suggests that immigration is now structured by powerful global economic factors, social forces, and cultural practices that seem impervious to state actions such as controls of international borders (Andreas 2000; Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994). Transnational labor-recruiting networks, enduring wage differentials between nation-states, changing standards of consumption, family reunification, and war generate a powerful migratory momentum not easily contained by unilateral, or even multilateral, state interventions to curb it.

THE VARIETIES OF THE IMMIGRANT EXPERIENCE

When settled in a new country, how do immigrants fare? The United States, as the ur-country of immigration, provides an interesting case study. It is the only advanced, postindustrial democracy where immigration is at once history and destiny. The intensification of globalization in the past decade—arguably responsible for the greatest peacetime expansion of the US economy—coincided with the largest number of immigrants in history (US Bureau of the Census 1999). By the year 2000, the foreign-stock (the foreign born plus the US-born second generation) population of the United States was nearly 55 million people (Portes and Rumbaut 2001), more than 32.5 million of them foreign-born. Two dominant features characterize this most recent wave of immigration: its intensity (the immigrant population grew by




FIGURE 2.1
Distribution of the foreign born by region of birth (2002). Source: Current Population Survey, 2002, PGP-3, US Census Bureau.

more than 30 percent in the 1990s) and the radical shift in the sources of new immigration. Until 1950, nearly 90 percent of all immigrants were Europeans or Canadians. Today, more than 50 percent of all immigrants are Latin American, and more than 25 percent are Asian—from regions of the world where globalization has generated especially uneven results (see figure 2.1).

Immigrants to the United States today compose a heterogeneous population defying easy generalizations (Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 2001). They include highly educated, highly skilled individuals drawn by the explosive growth in the knowledge-intensive sectors of the economy. They are more likely to have advanced degrees than the native-born population (see figure 2.2).

These immigrants come to the United States to thrive. These immigrants, especially those originating in Asia, are among the best educated and skilled folk in the United States. They are over-represented in the category of people with doctorates. Fully half of all entering physics graduate students in 1998 were foreign-born.³ In California's Silicon Valley, 32 percent of all the scientists and engineers are immigrants (Saxenian 1999). Roughly a third of all Nobel Prize winners in the United States have been immigrants. In 1999, all (100 percent!) US




FIGURE 2.2

Percent of the immigrant population with a bachelor's degree or higher by origin (2000).

Source: Current Population Survey, March 2000, PGP-3, US Census Bureau.

winners of the Nobel Prize were immigrants. With the exception, perhaps, of the highly educated immigrants and refugees escaping Nazi Europe, immigrants in the past tended to be poorly educated and more unskilled than today's immigrants (Borjas 1999). Never in the history of US immigration have so many immigrants done so well so fast. Within a generation, these immigrants are bypassing the traditional transgenerational modes of status mobility and establishing themselves in the well-remunerated sectors of the US economy.

At the same time, the new immigration group contains large numbers of poorly schooled, semi-skilled or unskilled workers, many of them in the United States without proper documentation (illegal immigrants). In the year 2000, more than 22 percent of all immigrants in the United States had less than a ninth-grade education (see figure 2.3).

These are workers, many of them from Latin America and the Caribbean, drawn by the service sector of the US economy, where there seems to be an insatiable appetite for foreign folk. They typically end up in poorly paid, low-prestige jobs often lacking insurance and basic safeties. Unlike the low-skilled factory jobs of yesterday, the kinds of jobs usually available to low-skilled immigrants today do not hold much realistic promise for upward mobility (Portes 1996:1-15). These immi-




FIGURE 2.3
Percent of the immigrant population with less than the ninth grade completed by origin (2002).

grants tend to settle in areas of deep poverty and racial segregation (Orfield 1998, 2002). Concentrated poverty is associated with the “disappearance of meaningful work opportunities” (Wilson 1997). When poverty is combined with racial segregation, the outcomes can be dim (Massey and Denton 1993:3).

CULTURE MATTERS

In all countries facing immigration, there have been major debates surrounding the cultural and socioeconomic consequences of large-scale population movements. In the United States, a palpable concern, not always fully articulated, relates to how the new immigrants—the majority of whom are non-English speaking, non-European people of color migrating in large numbers from the developing world—will culturally adapt to and transform their new country. In western Europe, there are similar concerns about the cultural adaptations of large numbers of immigrants coming into the Judeo-Christian continent from the Islamic world (Suárez-Orozco 1991b). The anxieties about the long-term vicissitudes of Islam in Europe have been greatly accentuated since September 11, 2001. Likewise, in Japan, a country where mythologies of racial and cultural homogeneity are deeply implicated in the

construction of cultural identity, questions exist about the long-term consequences of increasing migration from Thailand, Korea, China, the Philippines, and South America (Tsuda 1996, 2003).

Some critics of immigration worry about the economic dimensions, and many others focus on the cultural implications. Analytically, it is sometimes useful to differentiate between two broad spheres of culture: instrumental culture and expressive culture. By *instrumental culture*, I refer to the skills, competencies, and social behaviors necessary to make a living and contribute to society. By *expressive culture*, I mean the values, worldviews, and patterning of interpersonal relations and sensibilities that give meaning and sustain the sense of self. Taken together, these qualities of culture generate shared meanings and understandings and a sense of belonging.

In the instrumental realm, globalization seems to be stimulating a worldwide convergence in the skills necessary to function in today's economy. In Los Angeles, Lima, or Lagos, the skills required to thrive in the global economy are fundamentally the same. These include communication skills, higher-order symbolic and cognitive skills, as well as habits of work and interpersonal talents common in any cosmopolitan setting. The ability to work with the culturally "other" is also a skill that will be increasingly remunerated, thanks to globalization.

Immigrant parents worldwide are very much aware that if their children are to thrive, they must acquire these skills. In math, children the world over will need the higher-order skills to master, at a minimum, fractions, decimals, line graphs, probabilities, and other basic statistics. In literacy, they will need the ability to read and understand complex instructions and manuals and to convey ideas in writing (in some cases, in more than one language). In logic, they will need problem-solving skills to address various possible outcomes by formulating and testing hypotheses, given certain antecedent conditions. Nearly everywhere, the ability to work with computers and with people from different linguistic, ethnic, and racial backgrounds will be essential for thriving in the workplace (see Murnane and Levy 1996, especially Chapter 2). Immigration for many parents represents nothing more, and nothing less, than the opportunity to offer children access to these skills.

THE ACCULTURATION DEBATE

Although immigrant parents encourage their children to cultivate the instrumental aspects of culture in the new setting, many are ambivalent about their children's exposure to some of the expressive cultural elements. During the course of our research with immigrant families in the United States, it has not been difficult to detect that many immigrant parents strongly resist a whole array of cultural models and social practices that they consider undesirable in American youth culture. These include cultural attitudes and behaviors they deem to be anti-education, anti-authority, and anti-family, for example, sexually precocious behaviors and the glorification of violence. Many immigrant parents reject this form of acculturation (Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 2001).

If *acculturation* is superficially defined as acquiring linguistic skills, job skills, and participation in the political process, the consensus on these shared goals is universal. If, on the other hand, we choose a broader, more ambitious definition of *acculturation* as also including the realm of values, worldviews, and interpersonal relations, a worthy debate ensues.

The first issue that needs airing is the basic question of "acculturating to what?" Taking the United States as a point of reference, we can observe that American society is no longer, if it ever was, a uniform or coherent system.¹ Because of immigrants' diverse origins, financial resources, and social networks, they end up gravitating to very different sectors of American society. Some are able to join integrated, well-to-do neighborhoods, but the majority experience American culture from the vantage point of poor urban settings. Limited economic opportunities, toxic schools, ethnic tensions, violence, drugs, and gangs characterize many of these environments. The structural inequalities in what some social theorists have called "American Apartheid" are implicated in the creation of a cultural ethos of ambivalence, pessimism, and despair (Massey and Denton 1993). Asking immigrant youth to give up their values, worldviews, and interpersonal relations to join this ethos is a formula for disaster.

For those immigrants who come into intimate contact with middle-class, mainstream culture, other trade-offs occur. New data suggest that

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many immigrant children perceive that mainstream Americans do not welcome them and, in fact, disparage them as undeserving to partake in the American dream (Suárez-Orozco 2000). Identifying wholeheartedly with a culture that rejects you has its psychological costs, usually paid with the currency of shame, doubt, and even self-hatred.

Even if middle-class, mainstream Americans wholeheartedly embraced new immigrants, it is far from clear that mimicking their behaviors would prove to be, in the long term, an adaptive strategy for immigrants of color. Mainstream, middle-class children are protected by webs of social safety nets that give them leeway to experiment with an array of dystopic behaviors, including drugs, sex, and alcohol. On the other hand, for many immigrant youth, without robust socio-economic and cultural safety nets, engaging in such behaviors is a high-stakes proposition in which one mistake can have lifelong consequences. A white, middle-class youth caught in possession of drugs is likely to be referred to counseling and rehabilitation, but an immigrant youth convicted of the same offense is likely to be deported.

The current wave of immigration involves people from fantastically diverse and heterogeneous cultural backgrounds. Beneath surface differences, a common grammar can be identified among groups as culturally distinct from one another as Chinese, Haitian, and Mexican immigrants. The importance of the family in driving and sustaining immigration and the emphasis on hard work and optimism about the future are examples of shared immigrant values. (For an overview of recent research on immigration and family ties, see Falicov 1998; Rumbaut 1996; Suárez-Orozco and Paez 2002 [especially Chapters 12, 13 and 14]; Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 1995; and Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, and Qin-Hilliard 2001c. For an overview of immigrant optimism and achievement orientation, see Kao and Tienda 1995.)

These three aspects of culture come to the fore in the process of immigration. Consider, for example, the case of immigration and the family. Many immigrants come from cultures in which the family system is an integral part of the person's sense of self. Family ties also play a critical role in family reunification, a significant force driving the new immigration. Furthermore, after immigrants settle, many emotional and practical challenges force immigrants to turn to one another for support, accentuating family ties (Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 2001).

Hard work and optimism about the future are also central to immigrants' *raison d'être* (Kao and Tienda 1995; National Research Council 1998; Rumbaut 1995; Steinberg, Bradford Brown, and Dornbusch 1996; Suárez-Orozco 1995). Their most fundamental motivation is to find a better life, and they tend to view hard work as essential to this. That many immigrants do the impossible jobs native workers refuse to consider is an indication of just how hard they are willing to work. Immigrant family ties, work ethic, and optimism about the future are unique assets that should be celebrated as contributions to the total cultural stock of the nation.

Countries unable or unwilling to tolerate or, indeed, thrive in the context of immigration-related changes need to carefully reconsider their dependence on immigrant labor. The one fundamental law of immigration is that it will change everyone involved: the immigrants and those among whom they settle. In the United States and Europe today, we eat, speak, and dance differently than we did thirty years ago, in part because of large-scale immigration. However, change is never easy. The changes brought about by the new immigration require mutual calibrations and negotiations.

Rather than advocate that immigrants, especially their children, abandon all elements of their culture as they embark on their uncertain assimilation journey, a more promising path is to cultivate and nurture the emergence of new hybrid identities and transcultural competencies.⁵ These hybrid cultural styles creatively blend elements of the old culture with that of the new, unleashing fresh energies and potentials.⁶

The skills and work habits necessary to thrive in the new century are essential elements of acculturation. Immigrant children, like all children, must develop this repertoire of instrumental skills. At the same time, maintaining a sense of belonging and of social cohesion with their immigrant roots is equally important. When immigrant children—be they Algerians in France, Mexicans in California, or Thais in Japan—lose their expressive culture, social cohesion is weakened, parental authority is undermined, and interpersonal relations suffer. The unthinking call for immigrant children to abandon their culture can result only in loss, anomie, and social disruption.

In the archetypical country of immigration, the United States,

emerged the model of unilineal, or “straight line,” assimilation. The bargain was straightforward: Please check all your cultural baggage before you pass through the Golden Gate. In that era, the young nation was eager to turn large numbers of European immigrants into loyal citizen workers and consumers. It was an era of nation building and bounded national projects.

Even then, however, accounts of immigrants rushing in unison to trade their culture for American culture were greatly exaggerated. German Americans, Italian Americans, and Irish Americans have all left deep cultural imprints in the molding of American culture. Even among fifth-generation descendants of the previous great wave of immigration, symbolic culture and ethnicity remain an emotional gravitational field (Glazer and Moynahan 1970).

Beyond the argument that maintaining the expressive elements of culture is symbolically important and strategic from the point of view of social cohesion, another argument is worth considering. In the global era, the tenets of unilineal assimilation are no longer relevant. Today there are clear and unequivocal advantages to being able to operate in multiple cultural codes, as anyone working in a major corporation knows. The ability to transverse cultural spaces has social, economic, cognitive, and aesthetic advantages. Dual consciousness has instrumental and expressive benefits. Immigrant children are poised to maximize their unique advantage. Although many view their cultural—including linguistic—skills as a threat, I see them as precious assets to be cultivated.

Large-scale immigration is both the cause and consequence of important cultural transformations. Immigration, I emphasize, inevitably leads to cultural changes and accommodations among both new arrivals and native citizens (Ainslie 1998). Immigration can be said to be the consequence of cultural change in that new cultural tastes and changing cultural conceptions of what is an acceptable standard of living have been implicated in large-scale migratory flows (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Sassen 1988). Culturally, immigrants not only significantly reshape the ethos of their new communities (Ainslie 1998; Gutierrez 1998) but also are responsible for significant cultural transformations “back home” (Durand 1998). As certain immigration researchers (for example, Levitt 2001a) have argued, in many settings,

immigrant “social remittances” profoundly affect the values, cultural models, and social practices of those left behind. Because of mass transportation and new communication technologies, immigration is no longer structured around the “sharp break” with the country of origin that once characterized the transoceanic experience (see Ainslie 1998; Suárez-Orozco and Páez 2002). Immigrants today are more likely to be at once “here” and “there,” bridging increasingly unbounded national spaces (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994). In the process, they are transforming both home and host countries.

Increasingly transnational immigration will need to be framed in the context of powerful—and, as of yet, little understood—global formations. New patterns of capital flows, new information technologies, new patterns of communication, changing cultural expectations, and the ease and affordability of mass transportation are generating dynamics that transverse the traditional boundaries of the nation-state. Global capitalism is increasingly characterized by “borderless” economies predicated on transnational capital flows, newly opened markets, and immigrant-dependent economic niches. All these factors would suggest that immigration is certain to remain a vital social phenomenon in the new millennium.

Notes

1. Yet another paradox of globalization is that as it unites, it deeply divides the world between those who can access and manipulate the new technologies and those who are left behind, “stuck,” so to speak, in local contexts (Batuman 1998).

2. Few topics have generated as much controversy as the economic consequences of large-scale labor migration. Do immigrants help or hurt the economies of their new countries? Do immigrants carry their own weight, or do they represent a burden to citizens and other established residents? Do complex, postindustrial economies need low-skilled immigrant workers, or have they become redundant? Much of the recent scholarship on immigration and the economy has tended to focus on concerns such as the fiscal implications of immigration, immigrant competition with native workers, and immigration and wages. Another important theme has been the economic integration and progress of immigrants over time (Borgas 1999; Espenshade 1997; National Research Council 1997; Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, and Qin-Hilliard 2001b).

The research findings on the economic consequences of immigration are

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somewhat contradictory. Some economists claim that immigrants are a burden to tax payers and an overall negative influence, especially on advanced, postindustrial economies (Huddle 1993). Others suggest that they continue to be an important asset (Simon 1989).

A recent study on the economic, demographic, and fiscal effects of immigration by the US National Research Council (NRC) concludes that in the American setting, "immigration produces net economic gains for domestic residents" (National Research Council 1997:3). Not only do immigrants "increase the supply of labor and help produce new goods and services," but their presence also "allows domestic workers to be used more productively, specializing in producing goods at which they are relatively more efficient. Specialization in consumption also yields a gain" (National Research Council 1997:3–4). The NRC estimates that the immigration-related "domestic gain may run on the order of \$1 billion to \$10 billion a year" (National Research Council 1997:5). Given the size of the US economy (about seven trillion dollars), it is clear that immigrants will neither "make it" nor "break it."

In fiscal terms, the NRC data suggest, "immigrants receive more in services than they pay in taxes" (National Research Council 1997:7). The panel estimates that "if the net fiscal impact of all U.S. immigrant-headed households were averaged across all native households the burden would be...on the order of \$166 to \$226 per native household."

The NRC study and other studies conclude that even though immigration is a plus in overall economic terms, low-skilled new immigrants have contributed to a modest drop in the minimum wage of low-skilled workers. They found that a 5-percent drop in wages since 1980 among high-school dropouts could be attributed to the new immigrants. However, no evidence exists to suggest that new immigration has "hurt" the economic condition of native minority workers, such as African-Americans (National Research Council 1997:5).

Other studies examine the issue of the socioeconomic progress made by immigrant workers. The research of Dowell Myers tracks, over time and across generations, various dimensions of the economic adaptations of immigrant-origin men in a region of the world heavily impacted by immigration, the state of California. His work explores three sequential outcomes: educational attainment, occupational mobility, and earnings. In fundamental ways, the recent Mexican immigrant experience in Southern California seems to replicate earlier patterns of immigrant adaptation. Yet, in other ways, Myers's findings suggest new—and disturbing—patterns.

RIGHT MOVES?

Myers's research reveals that, upon arrival, Mexican immigrant men tend to be poorly educated, work in low-skilled occupations, and earn low incomes. Myers finds that over time immigrant men make modest improvements in their economic condition. However, he also suggests that important changes occur across younger cohorts within the first generation. These changes, according to Myers, are strongly related to the much higher educational attainment of immigrant children. In other words, Myers finds an old story with a new set of characters: Poorly educated immigrant men make modest gains over time, but their children are able to attain more education in the new country.

Still, Myers's data reveal a disturbing new pattern: Among the children of immigrants, higher education "does not appear to fully convert into higher occupational status or earnings; and higher occupational status translates even less well into higher earnings. These under-returns are most pronounced for the more recent arrivals from Mexico and for young cohorts, including native-born, both of whom newly entered the labor market in the 1970s and 1980s." Myers concludes, "The social implications of these falling returns to education and occupation are regrettable, because the declining reward system may discourage other" immigrant children from investing in schooling as the route for status mobility (Myers 1998:188).

3. See "Wanted: American Physicists," *New York Times*, July 23, 1999, p. A27. Of course, not all these foreign-born physics graduate students are immigrants. Some will return to their countries of birth, but others will surely go on to have productive scientific careers in the United States.

4. I concur with Alejandro Portes (1996:1) when he argues that we can no longer assume that new immigrants will assimilate into a coherent mainstream. He articulates a critical question that is now in the minds of many observers of immigration: "The question today is to what sector of American society will a particular immigrant group assimilate? Instead of a relatively uniform 'mainstream' whose mores and prejudices dictate a common path of integration, we observe today several distinct forms of adaptation. One of them replicates the time-honored portrayal of growing acculturation and parallel integration into the white middle class. A second leads straight in the opposite direction to permanent poverty and assimilation to the underclass. Still a third associates rapid economic advancement with deliberate preservation of the immigrant community's values and tight solidarity."

5. I concur with Teresa LaFromboise and her colleagues (1998) on the need to reconceptualize what they call the "linear model of cultural acquisition."

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6. Margaret Gibson (1988) articulates a theoretical argument on immigrant transculturation and a calculated strategy of “accommodation without assimilation” in her study of highly successful Sikh immigrants in California. For a theoretical statement on the psychology of ethnic identity and cultural pluralism, see Jean S. Phinney (1998).