

Introduction

The Research Agenda

Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco and Mariela M. Páez

During the closing decades of the twentieth century, the process of gradual demographic transformation that had begun on the eve of World War II gained extraordinary momentum. At the end of the war, the population of the United States was largely of white European origin. By the year 2000, more than a quarter of the U.S. population was composed of members of ethnically marked minorities, including African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans, and the future augurs even more startling changes.¹ In a widely cited report, scientists at the U.S. Bureau of the Census concluded that by the year 2050, some 50 percent of the U.S. population would be members of ethnic minorities—making the term minority somewhat anachronistic (Fig. I-1). This and other census projections are somewhat uncertain. After all, the terms *Latino* and *Asian American* did not even exist fifty years ago; who is to say the terms as they are now used will have currency fifty years from now? These data nevertheless suggest an unequivocal social fact: the United States is now in the midst of unprecedented change.²

This increasingly obvious demographic reality makes it evident that the United States is becoming a country that is no longer largely white and of European origin (U.S. Census Bureau 1999). Indeed, the future of the United States will be in no small measure linked to the fortunes of a heterogeneous blend of relatively recent arrivals from Asia, from the Caribbean, from other parts of the world, and above all from Latin America.

At the dawn of the new century, the more than 35 million Latinos in the United States make up roughly 12.5 percent of the total population. It is estimated that in just two generations, the United States will have the second largest number of Latinos in the world—after Mexico. More Latinos than African Americans are currently attending U.S. schools. Indeed, Latinos may already have surpassed African Americans as the nation's largest minority




Figure 1.1. Resident Population Estimates of the U.S. by Race and Hispanic Origin: U.S. Census Bureau, October 2000.

group. The U.S. Census Bureau claims that by the year 2050, a full quarter of the U.S. population will be of Latino origin; that is, nearly 100 million people will be able to trace their ancestry to the Spanish-speaking, Latin American, and Caribbean worlds.

This book brings together some of the leading minds in the scholarly study of the Latino population of the United States. Because of the extraordinary dimensions and recentness of the phenomenon under consideration—from 1990 to 2000 the Latino population grew by 58 percent—this effort can serve only as an initial and somewhat tentative exploration. By necessity, we must ask many more questions than we can possibly answer with any degree of certainty. We must heed Francis Bacon’s “double use” of doubt.

Three general principles guided the making of this book. First, we define Latino studies broadly as the scholarly study of the Latino population of the United States and its transnational links to the Caribbean and Latin American worlds. It is an emerging field that must tolerate—indeed thrive—on ambiguities. We envision the field of Latino studies as a big tent covering a broad range of social science and humanistic scholarship. Thus the contributors to this volume include scholars who feel at home doing positivistic social science with large data sets as well as scholars in cultural studies who focus on post-modern theory and literary criticism.

Second, the book performs and telecasts a call for interdisciplinary work as a matter of necessity. Interdisciplinary work can succeed when it slows down—or, better yet, altogether stops—the taken-for-granted practices

that can bureaucratize disciplinary work. Interdisciplinary work imposes certain mutual calibrations of theoretical models, methodological strategies, and analytic perspectives. By definition interdisciplinary work subverts the reductionistic impulses common to many disciplinary enterprises" (Suárez-Orozco and Robben 2000, p. 3). Although each discipline must, of course, cultivate its own garden, periodic disciplinary crossings can open fertile new terrains. Something unique can happen when a psychoanalyst and a political scientist come together and are encouraged to develop and sustain a scholarly conversation. This volume brings together an unprecedented assembly of anthropologists, education scholars, health and medical scientists, historians, linguists, political scientists, psychoanalysts and psychologists, sociolinguists, and sociologists who share a scholarly interest in the Latino population of the United States.

Third, the book is comparative in nature. It examines the varieties of the Latino experience by considering all the major subgroups that make up the Latino population of the United States—Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central and South American, and Dominican. We examine Latinos in context: the Florida experience (Stepick and Stepick, this volume) differs from that of New York (Smith, this volume), and both differ from California (Vigil; Gándara, this volume) and Texas (Chapa, this volume).

The Latino population of the United States is a highly heterogeneous population that defies easy generalizations. As Stepick and Stepick, Torres-Saillant, and others in this volume suggest, the tired and facile "Latinos-are-a-big-family" glosses over the contradictions, tensions, and fissures—around class, race, and color—that often separate them. Indeed, most of the authors in this book would reject any essentializing—that is, any attempt to discuss all Latinos as one seamless whole. Bluntly, what does an English-speaking third-generation upper-status white Cuban American in Florida have in common with a Maya-speaking recent immigrant from Guatemala? What, precisely, warrants collapsing their distinct histories, current socio-cultural predicaments, and probable destinies under the same rubric? To complicate matters further, as Jorge Domínguez suggests (this volume), Latinos are not from the other side of the moon: in some important respects they are not particularly distinguishable from other Americans. How, then, are we to proceed? Cautiously.

In this book we have opted for the broadest, most inclusive, and most generous definition of Latinos: that segment of the U.S. population that traces its descent to the Spanish-speaking, Caribbean, and Latin American worlds. The term *Latino* is a new and ambiguous invention. It is a cultural category that has no precise racial signification. Indeed, Latinos are white, black, indigenous, and every possible combination thereof. Yet, as a number of authors in this book discuss, upon entering the United States, Latinos undergo a rapid regime of racialization.

The term *Latino* also lacks the specificity regarding national origin that terms such as *Irish American* and *Italian American* convey. Latinos come from over a dozen countries as varied as Mexico, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic (Fig. 1-2). They also include Puerto Ricans, who may move freely between the island and the mainland as U.S. citizens. Nor does the term *Latino* evoke any particular period in U.S. history. Latinos are among the “oldest” Americans—the ancestors of some settled in the Southwest and spoke Spanish, making it their home well before there was a United States. They did not come to the United States; the United States came to them. Latinos are also among the “newest” Americans, for two-thirds of all Latinos in the United States are either immigrants or the children of immigrants. Because the vast majority of Latinos in the United States come from Latin America—the number of Latinos from Central and South America grew by over 100 percent between 1990 and 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau 2001b)—we chose the term *Latino* over *Hispanic*—a term that emphasizes the population’s link with “Hispania,” or Spain.

Latinos have varied histories, cultural sensibilities, and current social predicaments. The vectors of race and color, gender, socioeconomic status, language, immigrant status, and mode of incorporation into the United States shape their experiences. Latinos are a work in progress; they are a people in the process of becoming as they settle, in unprecedented numbers, in the United States. The very term *Latino* has meaning only in reference to the U.S. experience. Outside the United States, we don’t speak of Latinos; we speak of Mexicans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and so forth. Latinos are made in the USA.

Given this heterogeneity, this ambiguity, and these internal fissures, what arguments can be advanced for a Latino panethnic construct? Are Latinos in the United States poised to achieve Bolívar’s dream of unity that for centuries escaped their brothers and sisters in Latin America? Or will each Latino subgroup follow its own path—Cubans in one direction, Mexicans in another, and Dominicans in another still? Is it not wiser, empirically sounder, and more promising to keep our gaze on individual groups such as Cuban Americans, Mexican Americans, Dominican Americans, and so forth? Yes and no.

Systematic scholarly work at the subgroup level has generated important empirical data and theoretical insight. The work by sociologist Alejandro Portes and anthropologist Alex Stepick is a case in point (Portes and Stepick 1993). By focusing on the somewhat unique features of the Cuban ethnic enclave in Florida, they have broadened considerably our theoretical understanding of the dynamics of immigrant insertion into the U.S. economy and society (Stepick and Stepick, this volume). Indeed, to date the vast majority of the scholarship on Latinos has tended to focus on individual subgroups.³ It is now time to extend the conversation.




Figure I.2. Latinos, by Type of Origin: Current Population Survey, 2000.

The case for broader scholarly analysis at the panethnic level can be made along at least three general principles: one based on politics, one based on theoretical considerations, and one based on sociohistorical themes. At the political level, the panethnic construct has emerged as significant. Latinos are entering the United States in large numbers at a time when the nation's ethos is dominated by a "culture of multiculturalism" (Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 2001; Glazer 1997). The social practices and cultural models that we have come to call multiculturalism shape the experiences, perceptions, and behavioral repertoires of immigrant and native-born Latinos in ways not seen in previous eras of large-scale immigration. A hundred years ago, there certainly was no culture of multiculturalism celebrating—however superficially and ambivalently—ethnicity and communities of origin.⁴ "Passing" was the name of the game. In the words of Berkeley cultural psychologist George De Vos, we have all noticed now the "passing of passing" (De Vos 1992).

Latinos today are players in social spaces where racial and ethnic categories have high-stakes political and economic implications. The largest wave of immigration in U.S. history—the wave responsible for the current Latino-ization of the country—took place after the great struggles of the civil rights movement.

One reason why racial and ethnic categories are relevant is that they have become critical tools in the workings of the state apparatus. Nation-states use these categories for various purposes, such as census enumeration, taxation, and apportionment for political representation. Racial and ethnic categories as generated by state policy are relevant to a variety of

civic and political matters, including civil rights, affirmative action, and equal opportunity; furthermore, such categories are appropriated and used by various groups for their own emotional and strategic needs.⁵ Because all major federal agencies have chosen to employ the broader panethnic term and because of a powerful bureaucratic and market-driven impulse to standardize and homogenize (Torres-Saillant, this volume), it is abundantly clear that in the context of the workings of the state apparatus, the subgroup labels are generally quite secondary to the panethnic construct.⁶

Another argument for scholarly reflection at the panethnic level can be articulated from the standpoint of theoretical considerations rather than politics. Work at the broader panethnic level can generate more robust conceptual understandings than work at the subgroup level. Our understanding of transnationalism might be a case in point.

Caribbean Latinos, especially mainland Puerto Ricans and immigrant Dominicans, have been depicted as paradigmatic examples of groups engaged in deep transnationalism, an analytic concept that is often used to refer to economic, political, and cultural strategies articulated by diasporic peoples across national spaces (Basch, Schiller, and Blanc 1995; Smith and Guarnizo 1998). Significant numbers of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans are said to lead dual lives—engaging in double consciousness, cultivating dual loyalties, living serially between their islands and the mainland. Recent studies, for example, suggest that Dominican immigrants have developed political, economic, and cultural adaptations that involve high levels of transnationalism. They remit large sums of money to their homeland, they remain substantially engaged in political processes there, and they return periodically with their children to nourish social and cultural ties in their island home (Levitt 1997; Guarnizo 1994; Pessar 1995). Research on mainland Puerto Ricans suggests a slightly different version of this general transnational dynamic. Although they are less likely than Dominicans to send dollars to the island,⁷ mainland Puerto Ricans remain socially, culturally, and at times politically involved in island affairs (Torre, Vecchini, and Burgo 1994).

It seems clear that our theoretical understanding of transnationalism might benefit from placing what the Caribbean pattern suggests in the context of a larger Latino framework. If we examine the Caribbean experience against the backdrop of, for example, the Mexican experience, a more subtle understanding of transnationalism is likely to emerge.

Mexican immigration to the United States has over the last two decades undergone a profound transformation. Historically, U.S. immigration policies, market forces, and the social practices of Mexican immigrants did not encourage their long-term integration into American society (Suárez-Orozco 1998). A sojourner pattern of largely male-initiated circular migration,

characterized by efforts to earn dollars during a specific season, dominated the Mexican experience for decades into the 1980s (Durand 1998). After concluding their seasonal work, large numbers of Mexicans returned south of the border, eventually to resume the cycle the following year. In that context, Mexican immigrants engaged in dual lives, displaying the kinds of proto-transnational behaviors now more fully developed among Caribbean Latinos. Like Puerto Ricans and Dominicans today, the Mexican immigrants of yesterday lived both “here” and “there.”

Yet data on various aspects of Mexican immigration suggest the intensification, over the last two decades, of a trend toward permanent settlement in the United States. Wayne Cornelius (1998) has argued that Mexican immigrants are rapidly moving away from transnational strategies. For example, over time and across generations, Mexicans tend to remit less money, become less involved in Mexican politics, and visit there less often (Cornelius 1998). Will Dominicans, over time and across generations, follow the Mexican pattern? Or will they adopt the Puerto Rican version of transnationalism, which by some indicators has intensified rather than decreased over time (Bonilla 1989)? The answer is uncertain, but its implications for our theoretical understandings are significant.

In the context of the broader Latino framework, transnationalism turns out to be a more complex set of social adaptations, which seems to take different forms and serve different purposes. Furthermore, it becomes increasingly obvious that transnational adaptations need to be systematically examined over time and across generations. This implies the value of a research agenda that would examine the varieties of transnationalism across sites, social groups, and generations to track longitudinal as well as transgenerational continuities and discontinuities in behaviors and adaptations.

There are other arguments for choosing a panethnic level of analysis. In striking contrast to the other major new immigrant group, Asians, most Latinos share a common language, Spanish.⁸ Not all Latinos are Spanish speakers, but the Spanish language has become ubiquitous. On Wednesday, September 13, 2000, CBS aired to a national audience of over 7.4 million viewers several Spanish-language commercials—with English subtitles—during a prime-time show, the Latin Grammy Awards. In May 2001, President George W. Bush made history when he delivered his weekly radio address to the nation in Spanish—a move that was applauded by some as a shrewd strategy to court Latino support and condemned by others as encouraging linguistic and ethnic divisions. The president was surely aware that Spanish is now the nation’s second language, spoken by nearly 20 million people. More important, it is itself a world language shared by over 265 million people. Thus although Latinos, like other groups, are divided by factors such as race and color, class, and national origin, the Spanish language generates a powerful gravitational field bringing them together.

Studies of language maintenance and shift suggest that Latinos, more than any other ethnic group, tend to remain loyal to their native language, with Mexicans being the most committed Spanish speakers (Portes and Rumbaut 1990). Even third-generation bilingualism is relatively higher among Latinos than among other ethnic groups (Portes and Rumbaut 1990).

Indeed, Latino families are distinct in their extensive use of Spanish at home. Recent data show that in their homes, about 83 percent of immigrant Latino youth use their native language primarily or exclusively; the comparable figure for immigrant Asians is 68 percent. Among native-born Latino youths of foreign-born parents, 58 percent still speak primarily Spanish at home; the figure is about 43 percent for native-born Asians with immigrant parents. Some 39 percent of Latino native-born youths of native-born parents report speaking only English at home, whereas 82 percent of their Asian counterparts do so. These patterns suggest that Latino families are more likely to retain their native language than other groups, such as Asians (Kao 1999).

Language is intrinsically involved in the processes of education, including literacy development, and identity formation (Darder, Torres, and Gutierrez 1997). Within the last two decades, language in education has become a subject of heated debate among government officials, policy makers, educators, parents, and concerned citizens. Most recently bilingual education—ever controversial in the United States—has been under a microscope as new initiatives for English-only instruction have been proposed throughout the nation (Gándara; Moll and Ruiz, this volume). Indeed, language is at the core of the Latino educational experience in this country, but as many of the authors in this volume point out, discussion of educating Latino youths should not be reduced to issues of language alone. It requires a full understanding of the social, political, cultural, and racial context in which language is embedded (Zentella; Moll and Ruiz, this volume).

Like Latinos themselves, the language of Latinos in the United States presents a complicated picture. There are many dialects, intonations, and varieties of Spanish, “Spanglish,” and English. For many Latinos Spanish is a lingua franca, but specific words, folk sayings, and accents often produce different meanings and values within the different Latino communities. Language varieties act as a way of signifying subethnic identifications and marking subgroup identities (Zentella, this volume). Language is also implicated in the social construction and conditions that shape class, racial, gender, and sexual identities. Thus the Spanish language in all its varieties plays a central role in the construction and transformation of the Latino community in the United States. Will Spanish follow the path of previous immigrant languages such as German, Italian, and Japanese and be asphyxiated in the United States? (Lieberson, Dalto, and Johnston 1975). Or will

it be the exception to the rule? Will the sheer force of Latino demographics—the fact that there is now a highly elaborate social infrastructure to support the Spanish language, the availability of new information technologies, and the continuing flows of Latin American immigration—provide the oxygen needed for Spanish to flourish in the United States? If Spanish does endure here, will its persistence be an asset or a hindrance for Latinos? Will globalization give an edge to Latino bilinguals? These broad questions set the stage for the theoretical and empirical work discussed in various chapters in this book (Pearson; Zentella; Gándara; Carlo and Snow, this volume).

Language is only one of the cultural building blocks crucial to any understanding of Latino identities. Latinos also tend to share cultural models, social practices, and religious sensibilities that shape and give meaning to their lives. Peggy Levitt (this volume) examines how Latino immigrants are transforming the nature of organized religion in the United States. They are now the largest ethnic group in the Catholic Church, making up over two-thirds of all Catholics in Florida, Texas, and New Mexico. She explores how their involvement in religion in turn shapes their social and political incorporation into the United States. Related to their Catholic affiliation is the importance of fictive kinship patterns (*compadrazgo* and *comadrazgo*—godparenthood) in structuring social relations among Latinos.

SOCIOHISTORICAL THEMES

The most robust case for the analytic use of the panethnic Latino construct emerges from various shared sociohistorical processes that are at the heart of the Latino experience in the United States (see Sanchez, this volume). This book identifies three such themes: the experience of immigration; the changing nature of U.S. relations with Latin America; and the processes of racialization as Latinos enter, and complicate, the powerful “black-white” binary logic that has driven U.S. racial relations. In the words of Silvio Torres-Saillant (this volume), “We share the experience of being uprooted by large socioeconomic forces from our original homelands. We come from societies with a history of unequal association with the United States, a country that has influenced and sometimes even dictated political behavior in Latin America.”

Immigration

The Latino experience in the United States has been profoundly shaped by immigration (Cornelius; Hondagneu-Sotelo; Falicov, this volume). The vast majority of Latinos are either immigrants or the children of immigrants. In 1980 there were roughly 14 million Latinos in the United States (Delgado and Stefancic 1998, p. xvii). Twenty years later, there were over 35 million.

most of them new immigrants. Large-scale immigration from Mexico, Central and South America, and the Caribbean has been the backbone of what U.S. scholars of immigration now call “the new immigration” (Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 2001; Edmonston and Passel 1994; Hing 1993).

According to Suárez-Orozco (1999), three distinct social formations lie at the heart of an emerging Inter-American Immigration System (IIS): (1) more or less uninterrupted flow of large-scale legal (as well as undocumented) immigration from Mexico, which rapidly intensified after 1980 and is structured by powerful economic forces and sociocultural practices that seem unaffected by unilateral policy initiatives; (2) more time-limited “waves” (as opposed to uninterrupted “flows”) of large-scale immigration from Central and South America—by the early 1980s, El Salvador and Guatemala replaced Cuba as the largest source of asylum seekers arriving from the Spanish-speaking world; and (3) a Caribbean pattern of intense circular migration typified by the Puerto Rican and Dominican experiences in New York, where Dominicans are now the largest immigrant group.

By the 1990s, there were more legal immigrants from Mexico alone than from all of Europe combined. By the end of the twentieth century, well over seven million Mexican immigrants resided in the United States (González Baker et al. 1998). More than one-fourth of all Mexican immigrants to the United States arrived in the first half of the 1990s (Binational Study on Migration 1997, p. ii). Mexican immigrants constitute nearly half of the total Mexican origin population of the United States.

The history of Mexican immigration makes it quite distinct from other immigration to the United States: Most remarkable is the “immigration” that occurred when Mexico lost roughly half of its northern territory to the United States. Consider also the joint U.S.-Mexican border, the critical mass of Mexican citizens and Mexican Americans now residing on the U.S. side of “the line,” and their heavy concentration in a handful of states. The large number of undocumented Mexican immigrants (it is estimated that nearly 40 percent of illegal immigrants in the U.S. today are Mexicans) also sets them apart from other immigrant groups—although perhaps not from the experiences of Central Americans.

By the early 1980s, the intensification of cold-war tensions in Central America and increased direct U.S. involvement in the conflict generated unprecedented population displacements and new migratory flows. During the 1960s, and again briefly in 1980,⁹ Cubans had dominated the Latin American refugee experience in the United States, but the 1980s were characterized by large-scale emigration from war-torn areas in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. By the year 2000, some 1.7 million Central Americans made the United States their home (U.S. Census Bureau 2001b, 3). By one account “one in every six Salvadoreans now lives in the United

States" (Mahler 1995, p. 37; see also Mahler 1995b). Also, the escalation of the war in Colombia and the sharp intensification of U.S. involvement in the conflict revealed the beginnings of a large-scale migratory wave as growing numbers of Colombians began leaving their war-ravaged country, many of them to head north to the United States (Krauss 2000, p. 1). Indeed, Colombians are the largest group of the "new, new Latinos" originating in South America; approximately half a million Colombians now live in the United States.

The Dominican-Caribbean experience is paradigmatic of what sociologists and anthropologists of immigration have called transnational migratory circuits (Hondagneu-Sotelo, this volume; Basch, Schiller, and Blanc 1995). This pattern of immigration is typified by intensive back-and-forth movement, not only of people but also of goods and information, principally between the islands of Hispaniola and Manhattan. Although the 3.4 million Puerto Ricans who live on the mainland are U.S. citizens and thus not considered immigrants, their sociocultural and linguistic adaptations resemble those of immigrant Latinos. Puerto Ricans, too, display intense levels of transnationalism; in the felicitous worlds of Luis Rafael Sánchez, many of them live "en la guagua aérea" (the air-bus) (Sánchez 1994; Torre, Vecchini, and Burgos 1994).

Another relevant feature of the new transnational framework is that even as Latinos enmesh themselves in the social, economic, and political life of their new lands (Cornelius 1998; Durand 1998), they remain powerful protagonists in the economic, political, and cultural spheres in the countries they left behind. Latinos are emerging as "hemispheric citizens." Latino remittances and investments have become vital to the economies of varied countries of emigration, such as the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and El Salvador. In the latter country, remittances in the 1990s became the largest source of foreign exchange, averaging over a billion dollars a year. Likewise, the Binational Study on Immigration estimates that remittances to Mexico were "equivalent to 57 percent of the foreign exchange available through direct investment in 1995, and 5 percent of the total income supplied by exports" (Binational Study on Migration 1997, p. vii).¹⁰

Politically, Latinos are also becoming increasingly relevant actors with influence in political processes both "here" and "there." Some observers have noted that the outcomes of Dominican elections are routinely determined in New York City, where Dominicans are the largest group of new immigrants (Pessar 1995). Likewise, Mexican politicians have recently "discovered" the political value of the more than seven million Mexican immigrants living in the United States. Mexican President Vicente Fox underscored a new official attitude toward expatriates when he toured the border region in December 2000 to welcome back personally a few of the estimated one million Mexicans traveling south for Christmas. The new Mexican

dual-nationality initiative, whereby Mexican immigrants who become naturalized U.S. citizens would retain a host of political and other rights in Mexico, is also the product of this emerging transnational framework.

Culturally Latinos not only are significantly reshaping the ethos of their new communities but also are responsible for significant social transformations in their countries of origin. Peggy Levitt (1997) has argued that Dominican and Brazilian “social remittances” affect the values, cultural models, and social practices of those left behind. Immigrant Latinos today are more likely to be at once “here” and “there,” bridging increasingly unbounded national spaces (Basch, Schiller, and Blanc 1995), and in the process to transform both home and host countries.

Several features characterize the new Latin American immigration to the United States. First, a growing body of research suggests that the economic restructuring and sociocultural changes taking place in the Americas virtually ensure that Latin American immigration to the United States will be a long-term phenomenon. Globalization and economic restructuring have intensified inequality in Latin America, generating unemployment and underemployment—and hence new migratory waves (Dussel 2000). Beyond Mexico and Central America, the contours of a large-scale South American exodus became increasingly clear by the end of the year 2000 when large numbers of Ecuadorians, Peruvians, Venezuelans, and Argentineans headed north (*Washington Post* 2000, p. A1) (see Table I.1).

On the U.S. side of “the line,” there is a voracious and enduring demand—indeed, *addiction* might be a more appropriate term—for immigrant workers in both the service sector and the knowledge-intensive sector of the economy (Cornelius 1998). The extraordinary Latino population growth in Nevada, Georgia, Arkansas, and North Carolina during the 1990s (see Table I.2) is tied to the explosion of new jobs in the construction, service, meat, and poultry industries in those states (*New York Times* 2000, 15). It is likely that the extremely high flows of Latin American immigration to the United States during the last two decades will eventually decrease (Binational Study on Migration 1997), but it is safe to assume that Latin Americans will continue to dominate immigration to the United States over the next decades.

Second, new data suggest that the immigration momentum we are currently witnessing cannot be easily contained by unilateral policy initiatives, such as the various border control efforts and theatrics that have intensified over the last decade (Chavez 2001; Andreas 2000). Transnational labor-recruiting networks, family reunification, and wage differentials continue to act as a powerful impetus to Latin American immigration to the United States.

Third, new data suggest that Latin American immigrants are in the United States to stay. Today’s Latin American immigrants, especially Mexicans

TABLE 1.1. Hispanic Population by Type: 2000

<i>Subject</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>
<i>Hispanic or Latino Origin</i>		
Total population	281,421,906	100.0
Hispanic or Latino (of any race)	35,305,818	12.5
Not Hispanic or Latino	246,116,088	87.5
<i>Hispanic or Latino by Type</i>		
Hispanic or Latino (of any race)	35,305,818	100.0
Mexican	20,640,711	58.5
Puerto Rican	3,406,178	9.6
Cuban	1,241,685	3.5
Other Hispanic or Latino	10,017,244	28.4
Dominican (Dominican Republic)	764,945	2.2
Central American (excludes Mexican)	1,686,937	4.8
Costa Rican	68,588	0.2
Guatemalan	372,487	1.1
Honduran	217,569	0.6
Nicaraguan	177,684	0.5
Panamanian	91,723	0.3
Salvadoran	655,165	1.9
Other Central American	103,721	0.3
South American	1,353,562	3.8
Argentinean	100,864	0.3
Bolivian	42,068	0.1
Chilean	68,849	0.2
Colombian	470,684	1.3
Ecuadorian	260,559	0.7
Paraguayan	8,769	0.0
Peruvian	233,926	0.7
Uruguayan	18,804	0.1
Venezuelan	91,507	0.3
Other South American	57,532	0.2
<i>Spaniard</i>	100,135	0.3
<i>All other Hispanic or Latino</i>	6,111,665	17.3
Checkbox only, other Hispanic	1,733,274	4.9
Write-in Spanish	686,004	1.9
Write-in Hispanic	2,454,529	7.0
Write-in Latino	450,769	1.3
Not elsewhere classified	787,089	2.2

SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, May 2001.

TABLE 1-2. Hispanic Population by Type for Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: 1990 and 2000
 (For information on confidentiality protection, nonsampling error, and definitions, see www.census.gov/prod/2002/abs/decennial.html)

	1990			2000			2000			
	Total Population	Hispanic Population		Total Population	Hispanic Population		Hispanic Type			
		Number	Percent		Number	Percent	Mexican	Puerto Rican	Cuban	Other Hispanic
United States	248,789,873	22,354,059	9.0	281,421,906	35,305,818	12.5	20,640,711	3,406,178	1,211,685	10,047,244
Region										
Northeast	50,809,229	3,754,389	7.4	53,594,378	3,254,087	6.1	479,169	2,054,574	168,959	2,551,385
Midwest	59,668,632	1,726,509	2.9	64,392,776	3,124,532	4.9	2,290,196	325,363	45,305	553,668
South	85,445,939	6,767,021	7.9	100,236,829	11,586,096	11.6	6,548,081	759,305	921,427	3,357,883
West	52,786,082	19,196,140	36.4	63,197,392	15,349,593	24.3	11,413,265	246,936	195,994	3,574,398
State										
Alabama	4,940,587	24,629	0.5	4,417,199	75,839	1.7	44,522	6,322	2,354	22,632
Alaska	559,043	17,893	3.2	629,932	25,852	4.1	13,334	2,049	553	9,516
Arizona	3,665,228	688,338	18.8	5,139,632	1,295,617	25.3	1,065,578	17,587	5,272	207,180
Arkansas	2,350,725	19,876	0.8	2,673,499	86,866	3.2	61,204	2,473	959	22,239
California	29,769,021	7,687,938	25.8	33,871,648	10,966,556	32.4	8,455,926	149,579	72,286	2,297,774
Colorado	3,294,394	424,392	12.9	4,301,261	735,691	17.1	459,760	12,993	3,791	268,147
Connecticut	3,287,116	213,116	6.5	3,495,565	329,323	9.4	23,484	194,443	7,191	95,295
Delaware	666,168	15,820	2.4	783,699	37,277	4.8	12,986	14,095	932	9,354
District of Columbia	696,900	32,710	4.7	572,669	44,953	7.9	5,098	2,328	1,191	36,426
Florida	12,937,926	1,574,143	12.2	15,982,578	2,682,715	16.8	365,925	482,927	833,129	1,093,643
Georgia	6,478,216	108,922	1.7	8,186,453	435,227	5.3	275,288	35,532	12,536	111,871
Hawaii	1,108,229	81,399	7.3	1,211,537	87,699	7.2	19,829	39,065	711	37,163
Idaho	1,096,749	32,927	3.0	1,293,953	191,699	14.8	79,324	1,509	498	20,449
Illinois	11,439,692	994,446	8.7	12,119,293	1,539,262	12.7	1,144,399	157,851	18,438	209,583
Indiana	5,544,159	98,788	1.8	6,080,185	214,536	3.5	153,042	19,678	2,754	39,092
Iowa	2,776,755	32,647	1.2	2,926,324	82,473	2.8	61,154	2,699	759	17,879
Kansas	2,477,571	93,679	3.8	2,988,418	188,252	6.3	148,270	5,237	1,689	33,065
Kentucky	3,685,296	21,984	0.6	4,041,769	59,939	1.5	31,385	6,469	3,516	18,569

Louisiana	4,219,973	93,944	2.2	4,468,976	197,738	2.4	32,267	7,670	8,448	59,353
Maine	1,227,928	6,829	0.6	1,274,924	9,300	0.7	2,756	2,275	478	3,851
Maryland	4,781,468	125,192	2.6	5,296,486	227,916	4.3	39,999	25,570	6,754	153,692
Massachusetts	6,916,425	287,549	4.8	6,349,097	428,729	6.8	32,288	199,297	8,867	198,367
Michigan	9,295,297	291,596	2.2	9,938,414	323,877	3.3	229,799	26,941	7,210	68,948
Minnesota	4,375,999	53,884	1.2	4,919,479	143,382	2.9	95,613	6,616	2,527	38,626
Mississippi	2,573,216	15,931	0.6	2,844,658	39,569	1.4	21,616	2,881	1,598	13,564
Missouri	5,117,973	61,792	1.2	5,995,211	118,592	2.1	77,887	6,677	3,022	31,906
Montana	799,965	12,174	1.5	962,195	18,981	2.9	11,735	931	285	5,139
Nebraska	1,578,385	36,969	2.3	1,711,263	94,425	5.5	71,639	1,993	859	29,543
Nevada	1,291,833	124,419	19.1	1,998,257	393,970	19.7	285,764	19,429	11,498	86,288
New Hampshire	1,199,252	11,333	1.0	1,235,786	26,489	1.7	4,599	6,215	785	8,899
New Jersey	7,730,188	739,861	9.6	8,414,359	1,117,191	13.3	192,929	366,788	77,337	579,137
New Mexico	1,515,969	579,224	38.2	1,819,946	765,386	42.1	339,949	4,488	2,588	428,261
New York	17,990,455	2,214,926	12.3	18,976,457	2,867,583	15.1	266,889	1,659,293	62,599	1,493,811
North Carolina	6,628,637	76,726	1.2	8,949,313	378,963	4.7	246,545	31,117	7,389	93,912
North Dakota	638,899	4,665	0.7	642,299	7,786	1.2	4,295	567	250	2,734
Ohio	10,847,115	139,696	1.3	11,353,149	217,123	1.9	90,663	66,269	3,152	55,699
Oklahoma	3,145,585	86,169	2.7	3,450,654	179,394	5.2	132,813	8,153	1,759	36,579
Oregon	2,842,321	112,797	4.0	3,421,399	275,314	8.9	214,662	5,992	3,091	52,469
Pennsylvania	11,881,643	232,262	2.0	12,281,054	394,688	3.2	55,178	228,557	10,363	99,999
Rhode Island	1,093,464	45,752	4.6	1,948,319	99,826	8.7	5,881	25,422	1,128	58,389
South Carolina	3,486,793	30,551	0.9	4,012,912	95,976	2.4	52,871	12,211	2,875	27,119
South Dakota	696,004	5,252	0.8	754,811	19,993	1.4	6,364	637	163	3,739
Tennessee	4,877,185	32,741	0.7	5,689,283	123,838	2.2	77,372	10,303	3,695	32,468
Texas	16,986,510	4,339,995	25.5	26,851,829	6,669,666	32.0	5,071,963	69,594	25,795	1,592,194
Utah	1,722,850	84,597	4.9	2,233,169	291,559	9.0	136,416	3,977	349	69,226
Vermont	562,758	3,661	0.7	608,827	3,504	0.9	1,174	1,374	310	2,646
Virginia	6,187,358	169,288	2.6	7,978,515	329,549	4.7	73,979	41,131	6,332	296,698
Washington	4,866,692	214,570	4.4	5,894,121	441,509	7.5	329,931	16,149	4,591	99,934
West Virginia	1,793,477	8,489	0.5	1,898,314	12,279	0.7	4,347	1,699	453	5,879
Wisconsin	4,891,769	93,194	1.9	5,063,675	192,921	3.6	126,719	39,267	2,491	33,444
Wyoming	453,588	25,751	5.7	493,782	31,669	6.4	19,963	575	169	16,971
Puerto Rico ¹	3,522,037	NA	NA	3,808,810	3,792,746	98.8	11,546	3,623,392	19,973	197,835

SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau Census 2000, Summary File 1.

NA Not available.

¹Census 2000 was the first to ask a separate question on Hispanic origin in Puerto Rico.

and Central Americans, are more likely to settle permanently in the United States than those who arrived in the previous eras of immigration (Cornelius 1998). Latinos, therefore, are an enduring, rather than a transient, feature of the new American social landscape.

The Latino presence in the United States is largely defined by immigration. The vast majority of Latinos have been directly or indirectly touched by the experience of immigration. It is part of a shared experience and history that brings together the various distinct paths Latinos have taken in their journey to the United States. Although there have been differences in modes of incorporation and patterns of immigration, every Latino subgroup shares the experience of settling in this country and engaging in a process of social, economic, and cultural adaptation.

Dangerous Liaisons: U.S. Relations with Latin America

The eclipse of European ascendancy and dominance in the Americas as the nineteenth century came to a close and the parallel rise of the United States as the hemisphere's unrivaled hegemonic nation figured prominently in the making of the Latino experience in the United States. The story of the Latino population of the United States can be fully articulated only against the backdrop of the historical, political, and economic relationships between the United States and Latin America. The United States and Latin America have never been equal partners. U.S. relations with Latin America can be characterized as an asymmetrical liaison between a dominant power and a weaker, often reluctant partner. The history of U.S.–Latin American relations is, of course, complex and beyond the scope of this introduction (Smith 1996; Schoultz 1998; Bulmer-Thomas and Dunkerley 1999). We must, however, briefly mention a few themes that are especially relevant to an understanding of the Latino experience.

The first theme involves U.S. territorial expansion, a phase in U.S. relations with Latin America that historian Peter Smith (1996) has argued is best characterized as “imperial” in nature. It is at the heart of the nation-building process by which the United States emerged from the original thirteen colonies to become the continent's sole transoceanic power. This nation building was driven by an ideological apparatus with equal parts of pseudoscientific racism and cultural arrogance (laced with a good dose of Puritan zeal), along with a voracious appetite for Latin American land and other resources. It was achieved, largely via direct military confrontation and a series of territorial annexations, appropriations, and purchases (including the 1803 Louisiana Purchase for 15 million dollars and the Florida Purchase from Spain in 1819). But the choice prize of this imperial campaign surely was the territory that is now the U.S. Southwest. The

aftermath of the 1846–1848 Mexican War resulted in the annexation of roughly half of Mexico's territory.

The transfer of lands stretching west of Texas all the way to the Pacific Ocean—formally decreed in the 1848 treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo—is the most obvious example of how this expansionist phase was implicated in the making of the Latino population of the United States (Chavez 1984; McWilliams 1968; Acuña 1981; Anaya 1976; Montejano 1999; Weber 1973). Without taking a step Mexicans residing north of the Rio Grande found themselves living in a different country. Similarly, the seeds for the making of the mainland Puerto Rican community were planted in 1898 when the island of Puerto Rico became a U.S. possession in the aftermath of the Spanish American War (Silén 1989).

By the beginning of the twentieth century, relations with Latin America would no longer be dominated by U.S. territorial expansionist impulses. They gave way to a new set of dynamics and policy objectives. The well-known history of U.S. economic and cultural hegemony in the region—including countless direct and indirect military interventions in Latin American affairs—is at the heart of events during this era. It is beyond the scope of this introduction to examine systematically this phase in U.S. relations with Latin America. It has been extensively treated in the scholarly literature within the frameworks of Marxist theory, dependency theory, and world systems theory (see, for example, LaFeber 1984; Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Wallerstein 2000).

But there is no question that various U.S. military interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean during the twentieth century have substantially contributed to the making of the Latino population of the United States. Likewise, U.S. economic and cultural hegemony have contributed to uprooting Latinos from the Caribbean and Latin American contexts and to their resettlement in the United States.

In the aftermath of World War II, the Cold War came to drive U.S. intervention in Latin America. Whereas in the earlier era, hemispheric relations were shaped by a U.S. ideology of racism and cultural superiority, by the mid-twentieth century a relentless—at times fanatical—anticommunism dominated U.S. policy toward Latin America. Harvard political scientist Jorge Domínguez (1998, p. 33) has argued that the Cold War emerged

as significantly distinctive in U.S. relations with Latin America because ideological considerations acquired a primacy over U.S. policy in the region that they had lacked at earlier moments. From the late 1940s until about 1960, ideology was just one of the important factors in the design of U.S. policy towards Latin America. The victory and consolidation of the Cuban revolutionary government changed that. In its subsequent conduct of the key aspects of its policy towards Latin America, the U.S. government often behaved as if it were under the spell of ideological demons.

Chasing its demons led the United States to intensify overt and covert military interventions in the Caribbean and in Central and South America from the 1950s until the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Cold War tensions in the Latin American context took the form of various insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns stretching south of the U.S. border all the way to Patagonia. They left sequels of death, displacements, and devastation. In Central America alone, there were some 100,000 politically motivated killings in Guatemala and 75,000 in El Salvador, much of the killing taking place in the 1980s.

United States involvement in these conflicts intensified them, swelling the ranks of new refugees and immigrants. A decade after U.S. intervention, one million asylum seekers, refugees, and immigrants from that area of the world had fled Central America and now make the United States their home (Suárez-Orozco 1989). (This situation can be compared to the effects of the earlier U.S. involvement in Vietnam.¹¹) The intensification of the Soviet-American conflict during the Cold War also contributed to the development of a robust Cuban diaspora to the United States numbering over one million people. Likewise, earlier (1960s) interventions in the Dominican Republic and elsewhere fed migration to the United States. That is why many Latinos of Guatemalan, Salvadoran, Nicaraguan, and other origin can tell their American friends, "We are here because you were there."¹²

The end of the Soviet Union—and with it, the Cold War—ushered in a new set of priorities in U.S. relations with Latin America, except for Cuba. U.S. military interventions would no longer be driven by fear of communism and competition with the Soviet Union. New security concerns emerged: drugs, undocumented immigration, and after September 11, 2001—terrorism, and economic restructuring (Bulmer-Thomas and Dunkerley 1999). The 1990s saw a remilitarization of U.S. policy in Latin America (Domínguez 1999). The new focus was drugs, with extraordinary increases in U.S. military involvement in Colombia by the year 2000. The militarized antinarcotics effort is likely to deepen the upheaval in Colombia, where over two million citizens have been displaced from their homes—more than the war in Kosovo displaced (Krauss 2000). It is safe to predict that the size of the Colombian diaspora to the United States will grow exponentially as U.S. policy intensifies the conflict in their native land.

Ongoing concerns about undocumented immigration from Latin America and the Caribbean led to a slightly different militarized front pertinent to U.S.–Latin American relations. The 1990s saw an unprecedented security buildup at the southern sector of the U.S. international border—now the most heavily guarded border in the world (Chavez 2001; Andreas 2000). It is designed to deter drug trafficking and, especially,

undocumented immigration from Latin America. A related effort was the 1994 U.S. military intervention in Haiti, theoretically executed to stabilize the country but actually the first U.S. military intervention ever undertaken to contain undocumented immigration—specifically, the growing number of Haitian rafters arriving on the shores of Florida in the early 1990s.

The end of the Cold War, along with the development of new information and communication technologies, intensified the U.S.-led globalization that had been taking place over the course of the century (Sen 2000). It is now clear that globalization made U.S. hegemony more overwhelming than ever (Suárez-Orozco 2001). Indeed, some French intellectuals now call the United States the world's only "hyperpower." How will this new hyperpower affect Latin America?

In Latin America, globalization, economic liberalization, and restructuring have directly contributed to deepening inequality and the intensification of migratory flows. New regional trade agreements have also contributed to this process. The recent Mexican experience with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a case in point. The theory behind NAFTA was that the liberalization and restructuring of the Mexican economy—along with massive foreign investments taking advantage of raw materials and cheap labor—would generate economic growth, creating new jobs in export manufacturing and increasing wages. It was assumed that the growth generated by these economic restructuring and liberalization strategies would reduce the pressures for Mexicans to migrate to the United States in search of better jobs at better wages. In practice, the liberalization of the Mexican economy has so far produced mixed results. Growth has been uneven, with some regions of Mexico and some sectors of the economy benefiting much more than others. There has also been a rapid growth in inequality (Dussel 2000).

The recent Mexican experience also suggests that an increase in wages may paradoxically increase rather than decrease migratory pressures. As John Coatsworth (1998, 76) has noted, "Over the course of the twentieth century, the proportion of the Mexican population earning enough to cover [migratory] expenses [has] increased substantially. Should Mexican wages begin to rise again in the coming years, rates of undocumented migration to the United States will probably increase . . . as more people manage to save what they need to immigrate." This is in part because an increase in wages "stimulates consumerism and consumption and raises expectations regarding the standard of living . . . [which,] combined with easy access to information and migration networks, in turn create tremendous pressure for emigration" (Zhou and Gatewood 2000, 10). In short, there is reason to suspect that globalization will continue to be closely associated with large-scale immigration flows.¹³

Globalization is now the dominant vector structuring U.S. relations with Latin America. It is a postideological, market-driven process of economic and regional integration and interdependence. It is at the core of the “complex and interlocking forms of interdependence emerging between the United States and Latin America, involving the movement of capital, modes of industrialization, trade, migration, and growing inequality” (Bonilla et al. 1998, p. x). This new phase represents a continuation of the asymmetrical relationship between the most powerful country in the world and its poor neighbors to the south. But in contrast to the previous two phases, Latinos today are emerging as significant actors in contemporary U.S. relations with Latin America. It will be an important item in the scholarly program of the next generation of scholars of U.S.-Latin American relations to examine how, if at all, the Latino factor mediates the new U.S.-Latin American agenda.

Racialization

Much of the scholarly work on minorities in the United States has centered either on the concept of ethnicity or, conversely, on the concept of race. The theoretical work on ethnicity has focused largely on the study of white European immigrants and the transgenerational process of change as their children became “white ethnic” Americans (Doucette-Gates, Brooks-Gunn, and Chase-Lansdale 1998). A parallel current of theoretical work has examined the experiences of African Americans in the United States within the paradigm of race, exploring their unique experiences with the legacy of slavery, segregation, and “the one drop rule.”¹⁴ These two independent scholarly projects proceeded along parallel lines without much systematic and meaningful cross-fertilization. As Nathan Glazer astutely observed (1993), the vast majority of scholarly work on immigration and the making of white ethnics failed to consider the preexisting racial polarization so central to any understanding of American social structure. The new immigration, a human wave dominated by Latinos and other immigrants of color, is finally bringing the two conceptual paths together (Waters 1999). Will the experiences of Latinos best be captured by the paradigm of ethnicity or by the paradigm of race? Will they follow the pattern of yesterday’s white European ethnics or will the process of racialization lead to a remaking of the color line? The jury is still out.

We can envision several different long-term scenarios for Latinos. One scenario is that Latinos simply replicate the European immigrant experience and, over the course of a few generations, become, en masse, a version of yesterday’s “white ethnics.”

Another scenario would have the racially heterogeneous Latinos follow different paths as a function of skin color, human and “social capital.” In

this scenario, lighter-skinned Latinos who are able to settle in integrated neighborhoods maximize their opportunities for status mobility and, over the course of two or three generations, “disappear,” becoming *de facto*, if not *de coeure*, sociologically white (that is, like whites in terms of major demographic and social indicators). In the census of 2000, roughly half of all Latinos self-identified as “white” (U.S. Census Bureau 2001a, p. 10). Conversely, poorer and darker skinned Latinos, who settle in highly segregated neighborhoods culturally dominated by African Americans tend, over the generations, to disappear in the other direction, joining the black side of the U.S. “color line.”

In yet a third scenario, Latinos, by the sheer force of their numbers, finally break the black-white binary mold. Unlike previous waves of (European) immigrants, Latinos prove able, in the long term, to maintain certain vital cultural sensibilities and social practices via the replenishment generated by ongoing immigration, proximity to Latin America, and new communication and information technologies. In this scenario, Latinos manage to create a sociocultural space of their own. New Latino immigrants may be able en masse to articulate new strategies of adaptation beyond the tired old model of straight-line or unilineal assimilation driven by the “either/or” logic of acculturation (Suárez-Orozco 2000). As Falicov (this volume) perceptively argues, Latinos are pursuing and performing “both/and” identity styles and cultural adaptations. In the process they are redefining double consciousness, interacting with the institutions of the mainstream culture, and with their coethnic cultures in the United States, and acting transnationally by maintaining linguistic, social, economic, political, and cultural links with their relatives and other compatriots in Latin America and the Caribbean.

No one can say which of these tentative scenarios will prove most accurate in the long term, but three themes in the racialization process Latinos now face are likely to shape their future. These are (1) long-held stereotypes that mainstream Americans have of Latin Americans, (2) the low levels of education and skill of many Latin Americans as they join a thoroughly globalized U.S. economy, and (3) the intense forms of segregation—in schools, in neighborhoods, and in the workplace—that Latinos are experiencing. What are the dominant contours of these concurrent processes?

Negative Stereotypes. In his exquisite history of U.S. policy toward Latin America, Lars Schoultz has argued that U.S. political elites have long held the “pervasive belief that Latin Americans are an inferior branch of the human species” and, furthermore, that the “belief in Latin American inferiority is the essential core of United States policy towards Latin America.”

Here is a sampling of quotations through which Schoultz traces the way the United States related to Latin America for over two centuries. From John Quincy Adams: “The people of South America are the most ignorant, the most bigoted, the most superstitious of all Roman Catholics” (quoted in Schoultz 1998, p. 5). From Senator John Clarke: “To incorporate such a disjointed and degraded mass into even limited participation with our social and political rights, would be fatally destructive to the institutions of our country. There is a moral pestilence attached to such a people which is contagious—a leprosy that will destroy” (quoted in Schoultz 1998, p. 14). From Joel Poinsett, the first U.S. proconsul to Latin America—the man who brought the poinsettia to the United States from Latin America: “[Mexicans are] an ignorant and immoral race . . . [in] constant intercourse with aborigines, who were and still are degraded to the very lowest class of human beings” (quoted in Schoultz 1998, p. 19). From President Teddy Roosevelt: “[Colombians are] contemptible little creatures . . . jack-rabbits . . . foolish and homicidal corruptionists. . . . [T]o the worst characteristics of 17th Century Spain, and of Spain at its worst under Phillip II, Colombia has added a squalid savagery of its own, and it has combined with exquisite nicety the worst forms of despotism and anarchy, of violence, and of fatuous weakness, of dismal ignorance, cruelty, treachery, greed, and utter vanity” (quoted in Schoultz 1998, p. 164). From Assistant Secretary of State Huntington Wilson: “Nature, in its rough method of uplift gives sick nations strong neighbors” (quoted in Schoultz 1998, p. 205). From Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: “You have to pat them a little bit and make them think you are fond of them” (quoted in Schoultz 1998, p. 332).

Schoultz’s data suggest that U.S. opinion makers and leaders have been remarkably consistent in their views on Latin Americans from colonial times up to the present. In this ideological structure, Latin Americans are depicted as racially and culturally inferior, ignorant, degraded, filthy, child-like, and essentially unable to govern themselves.

It is not surprising, then, that in U.S. public opinion polls, Latinos rank among the least favored of all new Americans (Cornelius, this volume). Princeton University sociologists Thomas Espenshade and Maryann Belanger (1998, pp. 370–371) examined data on American public opinion about immigration basing their conclusions on surveys by twenty different organizations over a thirty-year period. They found that

Latin American and Caribbean immigrants in general, and Mexican immigrants in particular, rank somewhere near the bottom in terms of how Americans view immigrants from different parts of the world. European immigrants are most favored, and Asians fall in the middle. In comparison with Latin American immigrants, Asian immigrants are perceived as less likely to use welfare or to commit crimes, and more likely to work hard, to have strong family values, and to do well in school.

Wayne Cornelius (this volume) advances an “ethno-cultural” hypothesis to account for the specifically anti-Latino sentiment found in public opinion surveys and other data. According to Cornelius, the anti-Latino sentiment cannot be explained by the usual economic factors. Theorists of the anti-immigrant sentiment have argued that the best predictor of its intensity is the state of the macroeconomy—most specifically, the unemployment rate (Espenshade and Belanger 1998, p. 367). When the economy is weak and unemployment is high, public opinion generally turns against immigration. According to Cornelius’s hypothesis, there is an “ethno-cultural objection to the most recent wave of Latino immigration that underlies persistent U.S. public concern about immigration levels, regardless of the state of the macroeconomy” (Cornelius, this volume). Cornelius focuses his analysis on American objections to Latino ethnicity, language, and culture—along with their growing numbers—as an explanation for the persistence of such “ambivalent reception.”

The pervasive view, found among policy leaders as well as the general public, that Latin Americans in general are inferior and specifically are more likely to “commit crimes and take advantage of welfare, and less likely to work hard, do well in school, and have strong family values” (Jones-Correa 1998, p. 407) powerfully shapes the Latino experience in ways that we are only recently beginning to understand (C. Suárez-Orozco 2000, pp. 194–226). Most at risk are Latino youths who struggle to develop a healthy identity and sense of self in the context of such toxic attitudes and beliefs, an obstacle that further complicates the already arduous task of adapting to the institutions of American society.

Poverty. Over the past century, Latinos have been leaving a continent rich in culture, natural resources, and beauty but poor in terms of economic and social development (see Table I.3). It is also a continent of startling inequalities. Social and economic indicators reveal the breadth of the “distribution of sadness” south of the Río Grande (Vélez-Ibáñez 1996). For example, in 1995 the GNP per capita was \$2,521 for Mexico, \$1,671 for El Salvador, \$1,438 for the Dominican Republic, and \$379 for Nicaragua, compared to \$27,550 for the United States (see Table I.3, Wilkie, Alemán, and Ortega 2000). It has been estimated that the “average U.S. cat eats more beef than the average person in Central America” (Barry and Preusch 1986, p. 142). In 1995, life expectancy was 67.8 years for males and 73.9 years for females in Mexico, 50.7 years for males and 63.9 years for females in El Salvador, and 67.6 years for males and 71.7 years for females in the Dominican Republic, compared to 72.2 years for males and 78.8 years for females in the United States (Wilkie, Alemán, and Ortega 2000). Over 60 percent of the Guatemalan population, over half of the Nicaraguan population, 40 percent of the Dominican population, and over

TABLE 1.3. Selected Demographic Characteristics for Latin American Countries,* 1995

	<i>Population (millions)</i>	<i>GNP per capita</i>	<i>Life Expectancy Male/ Female</i>	<i>Highest Level Attained Postsecondary (% of total population)</i>	<i>No Schooling† (% of total population)</i>	<i>Illiteracy (% of total population)</i>
Mexico	83.226	2,521	67.8 / 73.9	6.5	21.4	10.4
Dominican Republic	7.110	1,438	67.6 / 71.7	1.9	40.1	17.9
Cuba	10.628	2,068	72.9 / 76.8	5.9	3.7	4.3
El Salvador	5.110	1,671	50.7 / 63.9	5.3	38.5	28.5
Colombia	34.970	2,107	66.4 / 72.3	10.3	11.8	8.7
Peru	21.569	2,363	62.7 / 66.6	18.2	23.4	11.3
Guatemala	8.749	1,337	55.1 / 59.4	1.2	61.6	44.4
Ecuador	10.264	1,476	67.3 / 72.5	11.1	1.8	9.9
Nicaragua	3.827	379	64.8 / 67.7	—	53.9	34.3
Honduras	4.879	672	65.4 / 70.1	3.3	33.5	27.3
United States	249.907	27,550	72.2 / 78.8	44.6	0.6	—

*The selected countries correspond to the top ten countries in number of immigrants coming to the United States. The countries are listed in descending order. That is, the highest number of Latin American immigrants who entered the United States in 1999 were from Mexico.

†Data for "No Schooling" correspond to different years: Mexico, 1990; Dominican Republic, 1970; Cuba, 1981; El Salvador, 1992; Colombia, 1993; Peru, 1993; Guatemala, 1981; Ecuador, 1990; Nicaragua, 1971; Honduras, 1983.

20 percent of the Mexican population have had no schooling, compared to 0.6 percent of the U.S. population (Wilkie, Alemán, and Ortega 2000). Increasing inequalities, coupled with the extraordinary burden of meeting foreign debt payments, have meant that "most of Latin America was still staggering" at the beginning of the new century (Skidmore and Smith 1992)

As a consequence, new Latino arrivals tend to be poorly educated and little skilled. A comparison of the average years of schooling for the top three immigrant groups reveals significant differences. In 1990 the average Mexican immigrant to the United States had 7.6 years of schooling, the average Filipino had 12.3 years of schooling, and the average Chinese had 12.8 years of schooling (Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 1997, pp. 27–28). By the year 2000, inequalities had intensified: only 11.2 percent of the U.S. population of Latin American origin had a bachelor's degree or higher, compared to 44.9 percent of the

TABLE 1.4. Selected Characteristics of Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Population

	<i>Hispanic</i>	<i>Non-Hispanic</i>	<i>Non-Hispanic Whites</i>
Total Population (millions)	35.3*	240.1	193.1
Median Age (years)	26.1	36.1	37.5
Educational Attainment			
Less than high school	43.9%	13.8%	12.3%
High school or more	56.1%	86.2%	87.7%
Bachelor's degree or more	10.9%	26.7%	27.7%
Percentage in Labor Force			
Male	78.4%	73.3%	74.3%
Female	55.8%	60.7%	60.3%
Percentage of unemployed	6.7%	4.3%	3.6%
Median earnings: 1998			
Male	\$18,430	\$30,468	\$31,486
Female	\$12,910	\$18,510	\$18,987
Household Income: 1998 (median income in dollars)	\$28,330	\$40,251	\$42,439
Type of Family			
Married couple	68.0%	77.5%	82.2%
Female-headed	23.7%	17.2%	13.0%
Male-headed	8.2%	5.3%	4.8%
Families below the Poverty Line: 1998	22.7%	8.6%	6.1%
Children below the Poverty Line: 1998	34.4%	32.4%	10.6%

SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, March 1999.

*U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, May 2001.

U.S. population of Asian origin. Because all U.S. workers other than those with college degrees have been losing ground in terms of real wages, Latinos today earn substantially lower salaries than other Americans.

As noted in Table 1.4, Latino males on average earn \$18,430, compared with an average of \$31,486 for non-Hispanic whites. More worrisome is the prevalence of poverty in the Latino population. Despite the high percentage of labor force participation, 22.7 percent of Latino families live below the poverty line. For non-Hispanic whites, the corresponding number is 6.1 percent. In addition, some 34.4 percent of all Latino children now

live below the poverty line, compared to 10.6 percent of non-Hispanic whites. Deep and concentrated poverty is powerfully implicated in a variety of long-term educational, social, and health outcomes (Massey and Denton 1993).

Latinos, we must again emphasize, are not a monolith (see Table I.5). Significant differences exist in these broad demographic characteristics and social conditions. In terms of education and socioeconomic standing, Cubans tend to have an advantage over all other groups. Stepick and Stepick (this volume) eloquently examine the social origins of the Cuban advantage. They document how the unprecedented investment of federal, state, and local resources by a U.S. government bent on rewarding the foes of a communist regime enabled Cubans in exile to develop an extraordinarily powerful economic, social, and political base. Partly as a result of the largest investment ever made by the U.S. government in a refugee group, Cubans today are the best educated and wealthiest of all Latinos. For example, whereas 50.3 percent of all Mexican Americans have less than a high school education, only 29.7 percent of Cuban Americans have not completed high school. Nearly one in four Cuban Americans has a bachelor's degree or more, whereas only 7.1 percent of Mexicans have comparable educational credentials. Whereas nearly 25 percent of all Mexican families live below the poverty line, the corresponding number for Cubans is 11 percent. Note that Puerto Ricans have the highest rate of poverty of any Latino group; fully 43.5 percent of Puerto Rican children live below the poverty line. It is worth noting that Mexicans have one of the highest labor force participations of all groups. They nevertheless face difficult odds as they try to penetrate the better-rewarded sectors of the U.S. economy.

Over the last twenty years, Latino immigrants have been entering a country that is economically unlike the country that absorbed—however ambivalently—previous waves of European immigration. Economically, the previous large wave of immigrants arrived on the eve of the great industrial expansion, in which immigrant workers and consumers played a significant role (Higham 1975). European immigrants got into an elevator that was going up fast: a U.S. economy that was in the process of raising the standard of living for all workers. By contrast, recent immigrants are actors in a thoroughly globalized and rapidly changing economy that is increasingly taking an “hourglass” shape. The elevator now has two destinations: “up” to the top of the hourglass and “down” to its bottom. Well-educated, highly skilled immigrants are moving into well-remunerated, knowledge-intensive industries at a heretofore unprecedented rate (Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996). Nearly 40 percent of all new businesses in California's famed Silicon Valley are owned by immigrants. On the other hand, low-skilled immigrants, many of them Latinos, are finding themselves sinking into the

TABLE 1.5. Selected Characteristics of Hispanics by Type of Origin

	<i>Hispanic</i>	<i>Mexican</i>	<i>Puerto Rican</i>	<i>Cuban</i>	<i>South/Central American</i>	<i>Other Hispanic</i>
Total Population (millions)	35.3*	20.7	3.0	1.4	4.5	2.1
Median Age (years)	26.1	24.2	27.5	41.3	29.9	28.3
Educational Attainment						
Less than high school	43.9%	50.3%	36.1%	29.7%	36.0%	28.9%
High school or more	56.1%	49.7%	63.9%	70.3%	64.0%	71.1%
Bachelor's or more	10.9%	7.1%	11.1%	24.8%	18.0%	15.0%
Percentage in Labor Force						
Male	78.4%	80.4%	66.3%	73.4%	80.8%	72.3%
Female	55.8%	55.2%	52.6%	49.2%	61.8%	57.1%
Percentage of Unemployed	6.7%	7.0%	7.3%	4.9%	5.9%	6.4%
Median Earnings: 1998						
Male	\$18,430	\$17,395	\$22,711	\$22,864	\$18,961	\$21,146
Female	\$12,910	\$11,995	\$16,444	\$20,673	\$13,309	\$14,832
Household Income: 1998 (median income in dollars)	\$28,330	\$27,361	\$26,365	\$32,375	\$31,636	\$30,463
Type of Family						
Married couple	68.0%	69.9%	56.7%	79.2%	66.6%	61.7%
Female-headed	23.7%	21.3%	37.2%	17.0%	23.7%	30.6%
Male-headed	8.2%	8.7%	6.1%	3.7%	9.7%	7.8%
Families below the Poverty Line: 1998	22.7%	24.4%	26.7%	11.0%	18.5%	18.2%
Children below the Poverty Line: 1998	34.4%	35.4%	43.5%	16.4%	26.6%	31.6%

SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, March 1999.

*U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, May 2001.

low-wage sector. And some scholars have argued that, unlike the low-skilled industry jobs of yesterday, the jobs now typically available to large numbers of low-skilled Latino immigrants offer little prospect of upward mobility (Portes 1996).

Segregation. Another important feature of the Latino experience is the increasingly segregated concentration of large numbers of Latinos in a handful of states in large urban areas polarized by racial tensions. By the year 2000, half of all Latinos lived in two states, California (11 million) and Texas (6.6 million) (see Table 1.2). Over 70 percent of all Mexican Americans reside in three states (California, Texas, and Illinois). A number of distinguished sociologists have argued that as a result of an increasing segmentation of the economy and of society, many low-skilled Latino immigrants “have become more, not less, likely to live and work in environments that have grown increasingly segregated from whites” (Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996, p. 20). Quite alarming are the recent findings of the Harvard Civil Rights Project, which established that Latino children are now facing the most intense segregation (by race and poverty) of any ethnic and racial group in the United States: “American schools continue the pattern of increasing racial segregation for black and Latino students. . . . Latino segregation by both measures has grown steadily throughout the past 28 years, surpassing the black level in predominantly non-white schools by 1980 and slightly exceeding the proportion in intensely segregated schools (90–100% minority) in the 1990s. . . . [S]chool segregation statistics show that the next generation of Latinos are experiencing significantly less contact with non-Latino whites; 45% of Latinos were in majority white schools in 1968 but only 25% in 1996” (Orfield and Yun 1999, p. 14). Indeed, by 1999 over 35 percent of all Latino students were enrolled in schools where 90 to 100 percent of their peers were other minority students.

School segregation is strongly linked to inequalities in schooling opportunities, processes, and outcomes. Forced to attend inferior schools, living in deep poverty and in heavily segregated neighborhoods, many Latino children struggle educationally against the odds (Moll and Ruiz, this volume). Most worrisome is the unacceptable rate of school dropout. In 1998, 29.9 percent of Latino youths dropped out of high school, compared to 7.7 of white, non-Latino youths and 13.8 percent of African American youths (U.S. Department of Education 2000). The future looms even more troubling, as schools throughout the country are instituting achievement tests as a prerequisite for graduation. Recent data suggest that large numbers of Latino youngsters are failing these tests. For example, in 1999 over one-third of all Latino students failed the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS). Of course, whether or not achievement tests are administered, Latino youngsters who are leaving school without the skills

demanding by an increasingly unforgiving global economy face dim prospects on the job front.

Latinos, we claim, are the offspring of these three broad sociohistorical processes: large-scale immigration, U.S.-Latin American relations, and racialization. These momentous social and historical vectors have shaped the experiences of Latinos in the United States. Although each Latino subgroup—indeed, each Latino individual—is unique, the lives, struggles, dreams, and deeds of Latinos in the United States can be fully understood only in reference to these formations and their enduring legacies.

ABOUT THE BOOK

The origin of this book was a three-day conference under the auspices of the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies and the Harvard Graduate School of Education. With the generous support of the Spencer Foundation, the Hewlett Foundation, the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and the Office of the Provost at Harvard University, more than fifty scholars from around the country convened at Harvard to examine the state of research in the emerging field of Latinos in the United States. The Harvard conference identified and named the major themes in the scholarly study of Latinos in the United States. It also established general parameters for charting an agenda for new basic research on Latino studies. All of the authors included in this volume presented original, heretofore unpublished materials.

This volume is unique. First, unlike previous publications, the chapters in the present volume were all commissioned to follow rather strict thematic guidelines. Two broad questions were at the heart of the original invitation: What do we know, and what do we need to know, about the Latino population in the United States? After identifying the topics most urgently in need of scholarly attention, we invited the leading scholars in the relevant fields (health, education, political science, and so on) to write original papers. For example, the scholars in the field of health were invited to reflect upon the complex scholarship on (1) the epidemiological paradox (Latino immigrants tend to be healthier than their nonimmigrant counterparts), (2) Latino access to health care, and (3) the problem of health and disease as a function of time and immigrant generation in the United States.

Second, the majority of the scholars involved in this project are themselves Latinos. Latino scholars have emerged as leading researchers in the field. The authors were invited because of the quality of their scholarship, the uniqueness of their perspective, and their passion and energy in pursuing important research topics in this field of inquiry. The extraordinary

success of the Harvard conference and the comprehensive scope of this volume are evidence of the growing role of Latino intellectuals in identifying, naming, and shaping this emerging domain of scholarly, political, and community work. Lest we be misunderstood, we reject the claim that only Latinos can or should study Latino issues. A number of the extraordinary pieces included in this volume were not written by Latinos. The notion that only Latinos can or should study Latinos is based on an anachronistic perspective on ethnicity that lacks scholarly currency and moral authority. It also suggests a reductionistic project for scholarship that is certain to undermine more ambitious interdisciplinary conversations and broader theoretical efforts. We echo Jorge Domínguez's warning (this volume) that the Latino population of the United States is too important to leave to Latino scholars alone.

Third, the chapters included in this volume grew out of a scholarly process involving many intra- and interdisciplinary conversations. The original papers were circulated ahead of time and presented in different panels addressing broad areas of inquiry (immigration, language, education, and the like). The Harvard conference was designed to allow authors to make brief presentations of their papers, with substantial time then devoted to commentary by various senior Harvard scholars, responses by the authors, and discussions among panelists. Harvard doctoral students from various faculties and schools were responsible for taking copious notes during the emerging discussions. On the basis of these discussions, we provided detailed and extensive editorial suggestions for each author revising the original paper for inclusion in this volume. We would like to think that all chapters benefited from this lengthy process. The chapters that follow offer a sampling of some of the most influential research in this emerging scholarly domain. The authors present original data and identify new theoretical and empirical problems suggesting areas in need of further scholarly work. Taken together the chapters can also be read as a plea for much-needed collaborative and interdisciplinary work. It is our intention and hope that the book will help broaden understanding—not only among scholars and policy makers—but also in the general audience about the profound demographic and cultural changes taking place in their communities.

NOTES

1. Throughout the book, the various authors represented here use terms: Latino, Latinos, Latina, Latinas, Latin@, Latin@s, Latina/o, and Latino/as. We, the editors, have encouraged the authors to use the term or terms of their choice.

2. Nor do these projections take into account the increasingly fertile field of transethnicity: Latinos, very much like other immigrants before them, are marrying

out of their various groups of national origin in large numbers. According to some estimates, nearly 30 percent of all married people of Mexican origin are married to non-Mexicans (Jiménez, 2000 [“Immigration, Assimilation and the Mexican Origin Population.” Filed Statement, Department of Sociology, Harvard University]).

3. See, for example, Alvarez 1987; Ambert and Alvarez 1992; Camarillo 1979; Chavez 1991; Cruz 1998; Flores 1993, 2000; Gomez-Quíñones 1990; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Guarnizo 1994; Gutiérrez 1995; Levitt 1997; Mahler 1995a, 1995b; Massey and Liang 1989; Nieto 1995, 2000; Pachón and DeSipio 1994; Pérez y González, 2000; Pessar 1995; Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Stepick 1993; Rodríguez 1995; Rodríguez and Sánchez Korrol 1996; Romo 1983; Sánchez 1993; San Miguel 1987; Suárez-Orozco 1998; Suárez-Orozco 1989; Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 1995; Torres-Saillant and Hernández 1998; Velez-Ibáñez 1996.

4. Indeed, the defining ritual at Ellis Island was the mythical renaming ceremony wherein immigration officers—sometimes carelessly and sometimes purposefully—renamed new arrivals with more Anglicized names—a cultural baptism of sorts. Others chose to change their names because of racism or anti-Semitism or simply to blend in. Hence, Israel Ehrenberg was reborn as Ashley Montague, Meyer Schkolnick was reborn as Robert Merton, and Issur Danielovitch Demsky was reborn as Kirk Douglas (Friedman 1999).

5. An outcome of our culture of multiculturalism is that new immigrants must be socialized into preexisting racial and ethnic categories, becoming, for example, “Latino” or “Asian.” Over the course of basic research among immigrant Latino youths, we have witnessed the disorientation they feel when they discover that their regional or national identities have little relevance in the U.S. context (Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 2001). A boy from El Salvador, will, depending on where he settles down, soon discover that what matters now is that he is a Latino, not that he is a Central American or Salvadoran—because the category *Salvadoran* will be irrelevant to most of his teachers, peers, and neighbors. These categories, although they are quite powerful, seem to have little resonance with new immigrants as they enter the country. Over time, however, they become increasingly relevant, particularly for children as they begin to struggle with identity formation, especially during the period of adolescence.

6. Peggy Levitt (this volume) also explores how in recent years the Catholic Church has strategically used a non-nation-specific approach, instead embracing a panethnic “Latino” construct to attract new immigrants from the Dominican Republic and elsewhere into the fold.

7. After all, Puerto Rico is a dollar economy.

8. Recent Latino immigrants are, of course, more likely to be Spanish speakers than more established Latinos. Over time and across generations, Latinos tend to become English-language-dominant. Furthermore, those who trace their origins back several generations in the United States may have little or no knowledge of the Spanish language.

9. In 1980, more than 129,000 Cuban *Marelitos* arrived in Florida over the course of a few weeks.

10. Cornelius (1998), however, argues that over time, Mexican immigrants in the United States are less likely to invest in capital improvements in their sending

communities. In fact, he argues that a new feature of the Mexican experience in the United States is that as Mexican immigrants become increasingly rooted in the United States, they go back to their communities mainly for rest and relaxation.

11. The fact that there are over one million Southeast Asians in the United States today can be directly traced to U.S. intervention in this region.

12. North African youth in France and elsewhere in Europe often respond to xenophobic assaults and identity threats with the saying “We are here because you were there.”

13. Zhou and Gatewood (2000, p. 10) point out that: “globalization perpetuates emigration from developing countries in two significant ways. First, direct U.S. capital investments into developing countries transform the economic and occupational structures in these countries by disproportionately targeting production for export and taking advantage of raw material and cheap labor. Such twisted development, characterized by the robust growth of low skilled jobs in export manufacturing, draws a large number of rural, and particularly female workers, into the urban labor markets. Increased rural-urban migration, in turn, causes underemployment and displacement of the urban workforce, creating an enormous pool of potential emigrants. Second, economic development following the American model in many developing countries stimulates consumerism and consumption and raises expectations regarding the standard of living. The widening gap between consumption expectations and the available standards of living within the structural constraints of the developing countries, combined with easy access to information and migration networks, in turn create[s] tremendous pressure for emigration. Consequently, U.S. foreign capital investments in developing countries have resulted in the paradox of rapid economic growth and high emigration from these countries to the United States.”

14. Here we must point to a disciplinary bifurcation in the use of the term race. Sociologists and psychologists have continued to use the term, but anthropologists are more skeptical and view race as a folk construct that, although powerful in its social and cultural implications, is devoid of any scientific (biological or cultural) foundation.

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